
Let
me first say how pleased I am to address this gathering
of transatlantic government and business leaders - a
group which is among the most important constituents of
the multilateral trading system. As we approach that
system's 50th anniversary, it is important to remember
how much we owe to the vision of a few people on both
sides of the Atlantic who together laid the foundations
of an international order which has secured for us a half
century of unprecedented prosperity. In many ways, the
Transatlantic Business Dialogue is a direct descendant of
this remarkable period of transatlantic cooperation and
creativity. Today we live in a world which is very
different from the one which existed a half century
before - a multipolar world of multiple interests bound
together by trade, investment and technology as never
before. But it is also a world whose security and
equilibrium is no less dependent on a strong
transatlantic partnership where not only interests but
also values and visions are shared.This
is why this dialogue is so valuable. You are operating at
the leading edge of economic integration, and the
accelerating pace of globalization gives your work an
importance which reaches well beyond your region. In this
time of rapid transition, business and government must
work together as never before to ensure that our national
and international rules keep pace with our evolving
economies; to ensure that they help, not hinder
adjustment; and to ensure that they provide a common
ground of stability in a period of breathtaking change.
The
problem is not globalization, as some think; the problem
is governance.
Tonight
I want to talk about this challenge of governance in an
integrated and interdependent world - and how the
transatlantic community has a central role to play in
bringing together the two main paradigms of this emerging
international order - multilateralism and regionalism.
Fifty
years ago the central challenge facing the postwar
trading system was to prevent a return to protectionism -
a path which had led directly to the Great Depression of
the 1930 and ultimately to the descent into world war.
The deep levels of economic integration we have achieved
today are in many ways a testament to the success of that
system. The new international competition is for wider
markets, more investment, and better technologies, not
for building higher tariff walls. And yet for all our
progress, it would be unrealistic to assume that deeper
integration is inevitably leading to a period of
universal cooperation and stability. The impulses for
international rivalries, competition, and protection have
not disappeared in our interconnected world - arguably
deeper integration makes them stronger than ever. In many
ways, these new challenges facing the international
trading system are now being played out in the debate
over the relationship between regionalism and
multilateralism.
Most
observers have concluded that regional agreements have
made a generally positive contribution to the
liberalization of world trade. In many cases, regional
arrangements have provided stepping stones for
integration into the global trading system - helping
industries, sectors and countries adjust to the
competitive winds of globalization. They have served as
important crucibles for trade policy innovation, the
results of which have frequently spilled over into the
multilateral arena. Regionalism has also often been a
source of creative tension in the global system as a
whole, forcing the pace of other regional and
multilateral initiatives. It is not coincidental that the
Kennedy Round moved forward with the creation of the
European Community, the Tokyo Round with the Community's
first enlargement, and the Uruguay Round with the Single
Market initiative and with NAFTA.
Perhaps
most importantly, regional integration has offered
countries a way to resolve issues that would be more
difficult to resolve in the wider multilateral context.
For the European Community - to take perhaps the best
example - greater trade and economic integration was seen
above all as a way of welding Europe's political future
together and making another continental war unthinkable.
The goals of NAFTA were explicitly economic rather than
political. But here too the idea was that North America's
degree of economic integration called for deeper and more
comprehensive regime of rules than could be achieved in
the larger multilateral system.
Now,
however, we find ourselves in a new phase of regionalism
- one which is qualitatively and quantitatively
different from the kind of regionalism represented by the
European Community or even NAFTA. The last decade has
witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of regional
arrangements. Since the entry into force of the GATT in
1947, 163 regional trade agreements were notified to the
GATT or the WTO. In the period 1986-1991 only five
agreements were notified to the GATT; the equivalent
number for the period 1992-1996 is 77. Of these 163
agreements, around 60 per cent are currently in force.
Thus over three quarters of the operational regional
agreements in existence today have entered into force in
the last four years.
And
it is not just the pace of regionalism which is different
today, but its breadth of ambition as well. The proposed
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), to take one
example, covers all but one of the 35 countries of North,
Central and South America, boasting a combined market of
well over half a billion people. And then there is the
grandest regional project of them all - APEC.
Spanning both sides of the Pacific Ocean and
incorporating three of the world's four economic
superpowers - the United States, Japan, and
increasingly China - APEC includes 40 per cent of
the world's population, some 54 per cent of the world's
GDP, and 42 per cent of its trade.
The
central argument for regionalism has always been that
smaller groups of countries may be able to move further
and faster towards integration than in a much wider
multilateral system. But does this logic still lie behind
the vast regional arrangements we see unfolding around us
today?
For
one thing, it is very difficult to make the argument that
liberalization is any easier in, say, APEC, the FTAA or
between the EU and the Mediterranean countries, than in
the WTO. Many of these new regional arrangements contain
countries as different in outlook, economic size and
level of development as any countries in the multilateral
system. And the points of trade friction are no less
vexing. For example, are negotiations between Japan and
the United States really any easier in APEC than in the
WTO? Can the Europe resolve the issue of agricultural
liberalization any more swiftly transatlantically with
Mercosur, or across the Mediterranean with the countries
of the Middle East and North Africa?
A
second point is that the globalization process itself
underscores the logic of global rules for global firms
operating in a global marketplace. As firms increasingly
internationalize their production and distribution
systems, and as economies become increasingly integrated,
it is in no one's economic interests to have a fragmented
system with fragmented rules and even perhaps a
fragmented dispute settlement system. This is even more
true in the world of borderless technologies we are now
entering - world where economic activity in areas
like telecommunications, financial services, and
electronic commerce will more and more take place in a
single, global economic space, one which is
basically indifferent to distance, time and geography. In
this borderless information economy, regional
preference becomes an increasingly inadequate
- even anomalous - instrument for managing the
integration process.
This
leads to a third important point - the new strength
of the WTO system itself. This year alone we have reached
path-breaking agreements in information technologies and
telecommunications - the combined value of which equals
world trade in autos, textiles and agriculture. I believe
a successful financial services agreement is within our
grasp. And we have made important progress in the 32
accession negotiations currently underway, one of which,
China's, will have an economic effect roughly equivalent
to the Tokyo Round. Hardly the signs of a system unable
to keep up with the fast pace of globalization.
If
the logic of regionalism often makes less economic sense
in an era of globalization, why are we witnessing such a
dramatic expansion of regional initiatives? Perhaps part
of the answer could be that in some cases these
initiatives are less about advancing regional economic
efficiency or cooperation - as the TABD clearly and
commendably is - and more about securing regional
preferences, even regional spheres of influence, in
a world marked by growing competition for markets, for
investment and for technology. This, in my view, is
potentially the most worrying feature of the new
regionalism we see unfolding around the world today.
Let's be clear that it is a feature which stands in stark
contrast to the unifying vision of the founding fathers
of the multilateral system half a century ago.
What
makes this competition more worrisome is that at its
heart lies the world's two major economic players
- the United States and the European Union. What we
see when we look at the pattern of regional expansion in
the world today is essentially two focal points with
concentric circles of preferential trade arrangements
radiating outwards - almost as if they were competing to
see who can establish the greatest number of preferential
areas the fastest.
If
it is true that the strength of the multilateral system
for fifty years rested on the strength of the
transatlantic partnership, it is also partly true that
the sudden proliferation of regional arrangements
reflects a certain inability of the transatlantic
community to coordinate its trade interests and vision.
One
danger is that this transatlantic competition could
encourage other regions to form more preferential
groupings of their own. The other danger is that we could
run a risk of re-opening the North-South divide - after
all, the only countries presently excluded from the
expanding web of regional arrangements are the least-
developed countries. This, in my view, would be one of
the most tragic outcomes of all since globalization's
greatest promise is its potential to erase the barriers
between previously separate worlds.
The
fundamental point is that while regionalism can provide
an important complement to the multilateral system, it
cannot provide a substitute. The solution, in other
words, is to globalize regionalism, not to regionalize
globalization. I see two important dimensions to this
task.
First,
we must ensure that the foundation of the trading system
remains non-discrimination as embodied in the two
fundamental principles of National Treatment and
Most-Favoured-Nation. Regional agreements which are
preferential by nature represent an exception to the most
favoured nation treatment. When the number and extension
of these exceptions to the most favoured nation treatment
reach a very significant level, the exception could
become the rule and the multilateral system would be
substantially changed. Surely our goal must be to make
regionalism conform to multilateralism, not vice versa.
The
second challenge is to ensure that regionalism and
multilateralism converge in their goals and aspirations
- which means that we must ensure that our
multilateral goals remain as ambitious as our regional
efforts. More and more the success of regional
arrangements must be measured in terms of their ability
to help design and build this new economic order
- both in terms of their own interests, and in the
interests of the global economy as a whole. Here
initiatives like the Transatlantic business dialogue can
play a critical rôle in channelling regional energies
and initiatives into multilateral negotiations - as
you helped to do so successfully in the case of the
information technology agreement and the recent
telecommunications deal.
I
know that you are playing a similarly positive rôle in
financial services - the key priority for the WTO in
the coming weeks.
The
objective of the financial services negotiations is to
achieve real improvements in access to markets.
Essentially, this means the right for foreign investors
to operate on equal competitive terms with national
companies in national markets. It also means the removal
of unnecessary restrictions on the cross-border supply of
financial services - restrictions which will, in any
event, become increasingly anomalous in a world of
borderless, electronic commerce. And it means protecting
equity rights already achieved in these markets.
I
believe that an agreement should now be close at hand.
Ninety-five countries have already made provisional
market access commitments on financial services in the
two previous negotiations, and in the negotiations which
are due to end on 12 December we shall see
improvements or new commitments made by something like 40
countries. This is a highly significant harvest. The
number and the quality of the commitments negotiated are
essential for a positive outcome. But it is equally
essential that we firmly anchor the financial services
sector in general in the multilateral system of rules and
procedures. We cannot afford continuing doubt about the
commitment of the major powers to multilateralism in this
fundamental services sector. We cannot afford to lose at
the last moment what has taken so long as so much energy
to attain.
Many
ask about the possible effects of the recent turbulence
in financial markets in Asia on the WTO negotiations to
liberalize financial services. Partly these reports
spring from confusion about the distinction between
liberalization of market access - which is our
aim - and capital account liberalization
- which is not. They are quite different, and the
Services Agreement explicitly recognizes not only the
right of all governments to regulate financial markets
but their responsibility to take whatever prudential
measures that are necessary to safeguard the integrity of
those markets and their liberalization. I am greatly
encouraged by the affirmation of all participants in the
negotiations that recent events in the markets have not
shaken either their belief in liberalization or the
commitment to this negotiation.
The
transatlantic community's unique contribution to the
global system has always been as a bridge - across
the Atlantic, across languages and cultures, across
interests. It is a community which already represents the
most important economic link in world - some US$ 300
billion in two-way trade in 1996, $810 billion in
investment, against a combined transatlantic output of
over $16.5 trillion. Nor do these statistics capture the
essential quality of the transatlantic relationship - the
extent to which Europe and North America are at the
epicentre of a growing web of transborder investment,
technology and ideas - the new arteries of the global
economy. In many ways the economic ties between your two
continents represents a single transatlantic market.
In
such an intense economic relationship disputes and
differences are inevitable - and fortunately we now have
in the WTO a new binding dispute settlement mechanism
where most of these conflicts can be resolved
expeditiously on the basis of mutually agreed rules and
disciplines. It is not only in the interests of all
government to strengthen and build upon this system - it
is there responsibility.
Yet,
having said this, it would be difficult for me not to be
concerned about certain recent signs of deterioration in
the tone of the transatlantic relationship. And this is
why an organization like the transatlantic business
dialogue is so vitally important. It is not that closer
transatlantic cooperation is an end in itself or an
alternative to broader global cooperation; it is rather
that a strong North Atlantic relationship is central to
our ability to advance a broader and multipolar global
community.
Let
me conclude by summing up what I see as being at stake in
this fundamental relationship. It comes down to the basic
question of what sort of world we want; one of three or
four major regional blocs - each of which
discriminates against the other's members - or a
truly global system of rules to deal with our globally
integrating world.
Perhaps
more than any other force, the principle of
non-discrimination - as embodied in the rules-based
multilateral trading system - has reduced power politics,
and guaranteed all countries equal rights as well as
equal responsibilities, irrespective of their size and
power. This has proved a remarkably cohesive force over
the years, providing a unique and invaluable foundation
for international cooperation and consensus.
Non-discrimination was the vision of the transatlantic
community which arose out of the ruin of the two world
wars and which has guided us to today. It is a vision
which has helped us to expand trade and investment, to
break down barriers between economies and peoples, and to
build the multilateral institutions which have done so
much to spread the benefits of modernization and growth
around the world.
It
must also provide a guiding vision for the challenges
that lie ahead. I repeat, the challenge is not
globalization, which is a growing reality, but our system
of international governance, which is still clearly
inadequate to our interconnected and interdependent
world. The transatlantic community is again being called
upon to help build a new vision for our globalized world
- it must be one still rooted in the basic ideals of
non-discrimination and the rule of law.
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