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Status of Safeguards Legislative Notifications
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XII. Article 11 back to top
A. Text of Article 11
Article 11: Prohibition and Elimination of
Certain Measures
1.
(a) A Member shall not take or seek any emergency
action on imports of particular products as set forth in Article XIX of
GATT 1994 unless such action conforms with the provisions of that
Article applied in accordance with this Agreement.
(b) Furthermore, a Member shall not seek, take or
maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements
or any other similar measures on the export or the import side.(3,4) These
include actions taken by a single Member as well as actions under
agreements, arrangements and understandings entered into by two or more
Members. Any such measure in effect on the date of entry into force of
the WTO Agreement shall be brought into conformity with this Agreement
or phased out in accordance with paragraph 2.
(footnote original) 3 An import quota applied as a
safeguard measure in conformity with the relevant provisions of GATT
1994 and this Agreement may, by mutual agreement, be administered by the
exporting Member.
(footnote original) 4 Examples of similar measures
include export moderation, export-price or import-price monitoring
systems, export or import surveillance, compulsory import cartels and
discretionary export or import licensing schemes, any of which afford
protection.
(c) This Agreement does not apply to measures sought,
taken or maintained by a Member pursuant to provisions of GATT 1994
other than Article XIX, and Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A
other than this Agreement, or pursuant to protocols and agreements or
arrangements concluded within the framework of GATT 1994.
2. The phasing out of measures referred to in
paragraph 1(b) shall be carried out according to timetables to be
presented to the Committee on Safeguards by the Members concerned not
later than 180 days after the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement. These timetables shall provide for all measures referred to
in paragraph 1 to be phased out or brought into conformity with this
Agreement within a period not exceeding four years after the date of
entry into force of the WTO Agreement, subject to not more than one
specific measure per importing Member,(5) the duration of which shall not
extend beyond 31 December 1999. Any such exception must be mutually
agreed between the Members directly concerned and notified to the
Committee on Safeguards for its review and acceptance within 90 days of
the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. The Annex to this Agreement
indicates a measure which has been agreed as falling under this
exception.
(footnote original) 5 The only such exception to
which the European Communities is entitled is indicated in the Annex to
this Agreement.
3. Members shall not encourage or support the
adoption or maintenance by public and private enterprises of
non-governmental measures equivalent to those referred to in
paragraph 1.
B. Interpretation and Application of Article
11
1. Article 11.1(a)
(a) Relationship with Article XIX of the
GATT 1994
240.
With respect to the relationship with Article
XIX of the GATT 1994, see paragraphs 4–9
above.
(b) Relationship with other Articles
241.
The Panel on US — Lamb, after making findings
of inconsistency with Articles
2.1, 4.1(c), and 4.2(b) of the Agreement
on Safeguards (and with Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994), exercised
judicial economy with respect to claims raised under Article 11 (and
Articles 2.2, 3.1, 5.1,
8 and 12) of the Agreement on Safeguards.(407)
(c) Relationship with other WTO Agreements
242.
The Panel on US — Lamb, after making findings
of inconsistency with Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 (and with
Articles 2.1, 4.1(c), and
4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards), exercised
judicial economy with respect to claims raised under Article 11 (and
Articles 2.2, 3.1, 5.1,
8 and 12) of the Agreement on Safeguards.(408)
2. Article 11.2
243.
At its meeting on 24 February 1995, the
Committee on Safeguards decided that the information required in the
notifications of the exception under Article 11.2 of the Agreement on
Safeguards should also be provided by signatories that were eligible to
become original Members of the WTO within the same time-limits as those
which apply to WTO Members.(409) The Committee also adopted a format for
notifications of the exception under Article 11.2 of the Agreement on
Safeguards(410) as well as a format for notifications on timetables for
phasing out measures referred to in Article 11.1(b) or for bringing them
into conformity with the Agreement on Safeguards.(411)
XIII. Article 12
back to top
A. Text of Article 12
Article 12: Notification and Consultation
1. A Member shall immediately notify the Committee on
Safeguards upon:
(a) initiating an investigatory process relating to
serious injury or threat thereof and the reasons for it;
(b) making a finding of serious injury or threat
thereof caused by increased imports; and
(c) taking a decision to apply or extend a safeguard
measure.
2. In making the notifications referred to in
paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c), the Member proposing to apply or extend a
safeguard measure shall provide the Committee on Safeguards with all
pertinent information, which shall include evidence of serious injury or
threat thereof caused by increased imports, precise description of the
product involved and the proposed measure, proposed date of
introduction, expected duration and timetable for progressive
liberalization. In the case of an extension of a measure, evidence that
the industry concerned is adjusting shall also be provided. The Council
for Trade in Goods or the Committee on Safeguards may request such
additional information as they may consider necessary from the Member
proposing to apply or extend the measure.
3. A Member proposing to apply or extend a safeguard
measure shall provide adequate opportunity for prior consultations with
those Members having a substantial interest as exporters of the product
concerned, with a view to, inter alia, reviewing the information
provided under paragraph 2, exchanging views on the measure and reaching
an understanding on ways to achieve the objective set out in paragraph 1
of Article 8.
4. A Member shall make a notification to the
Committee on Safeguards before taking a provisional safeguard measure
referred to in Article 6. Consultations shall be initiated immediately
after the measure is taken.
5. The results of the consultations referred to in
this Article, as well as the results of mid-term reviews referred to in
paragraph 4 of Article 7, any form of compensation referred to in
paragraph 1 of Article 8, and proposed suspensions of concessions and
other obligations referred to in paragraph 2 of Article
8, shall be
notified immediately to the Council for Trade in Goods by the Members
concerned.
6. Members shall notify promptly the Committee on
Safeguards of their laws, regulations and administrative procedures
relating to safeguard measures as well as any modifications made to
them.
7. Members maintaining measures described in
Article
10 and paragraph 1 of Article 11 which exist on the date of entry into
force of the WTO Agreement shall notify such measures to the Committee
on Safeguards not later than 60 days after the date of entry into force
of the WTO Agreement.
8. Any Member may notify the Committee on Safeguards
of all laws, regulations, administrative procedures and any measures or
actions dealt with in this Agreement that have not been notified by
other Members that are required by this Agreement to make such
notifications.
9. Any Member may notify the Committee on Safeguards
of any non-governmental measures referred to in paragraph 3 of Article
11.
10. All notifications to the Council for Trade in
Goods referred to in this Agreement shall normally be made through the
Committee on Safeguards.
11. The provisions on notification in this Agreement
shall not require any Member to disclose confidential information the
disclosure of which would impede law enforcement or otherwise be
contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate
commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.
B. Interpretation and Application of Article
12
1. Notification formats adopted by the
Committee on Safeguards
244.
Formats for certain notifications under the
Agreement on Safeguards, including notifications under Article
12, were
approved by the Committee on Safeguards on 24 February 1995.(412) The
Panel on Korea — Dairy noted that it was clear that the provisions of
Article 12 prevailed over the notification formats adopted by the
Committee:
“It is clear that the provisions of Article 12 of
the Agreement on Safeguards prevail over the Guidance issued by the
Committee on Safeguards (which contains a disclaimer to that effect) and
the Technical Cooperation Handbook on Notification Requirements
(prepared by the Secretariat but which explicitly states that it ‘does
not constitute a legal interpretation of the notification obligations
under the respective agreement(s)’). At issue in this case are the
notifications required under Articles 12.1(a),
(b) and (c).”(413)
2. Article 12.1
(a) “shall immediately
notify”
245.
The Panel on Korea — Dairy read a notion of
“urgency” into the phrase “shall immediately notify …” in
Article 12.1, but acknowledged that there is a need under this provision
to balance the requirement for some minimum level of information in a
notification against the requirement for “immediate” notification:
“The ordinary meaning of the term ‘immediately’(414)
introduces a certain notion of urgency. As discussed above, we believe
that the text of Article 12.1, 12.2
and 12.3 makes clear that the
notifications on the finding of serious injury and on the proposed
measure shall in all cases precede the consultations referred to in
Article 12.3. We note finally that no specific number of days is
mentioned in Article 12. For us this implies that there is a need under
the agreement to balance the requirement for some minimum level of
information in a notification against the requirement for ‘immediate’
notification. The more detail that is required, the less ‘instantly’
Members will be able to notify. In this context we are also aware that
Members whose official language is not a WTO working language, may
encounter further delay in preparing their notifications.”(415)
246.
The same Panel also notes that:
“There is no basis in the wording of Article 12.1
to interpret the term ‘immediately’ to mean ‘as soon as
practically possible’.”(416)
247.
The Panel on US — Wheat Gluten quoted the
above passage from the Panel Report in Korea — Dairy and emphasized
the need of all Members to be kept informed, in a timely manner, of the
different steps in a safeguard investigation:
“We consider that the text of Article 12.1 SA is
clear and requires no further interpretation. The ordinary meaning of
the requirement for a Member to notify immediately its decisions or
findings prohibits a Member from unduly delaying the notification of the
decisions or findings mentioned in Article 12.1 (a) through
(c) SA.
Observance of this requirement is all the more important considering the
nature of a safeguards investigation. A safeguard measure is imposed on
imports of a product irrespective of its source and potentially affects
all Members. All Members are therefore entitled to be kept informed,
without delay, of the various steps of the investigation.”(417)
248.
The Appellate Body on US — Wheat Gluten confirmed the above approach adopted by panels and added that “immediate
notification” is notification that allows the Committee on Safeguards
as well as WTO Members the “fullest possible period” to consider and
react to a safeguard investigation:
“As regards the meaning of the word ‘immediately’
in the chapeau to Article 12.1, we agree with the Panel that the
ordinary meaning of the word ‘implies a certain urgency’. The degree
of urgency or immediacy required depends on a case-by-case assessment,
account being taken of the administrative difficulties involved in
preparing the notification, and also of the character of the information
supplied. As previous panels have recognized, relevant factors in this
regard may include the complexity of the notification and the need for
translation into one of the WTO’s official languages. Clearly,
however, the amount of time taken to prepare the notification must, in
all cases, be kept to a minimum, as the underlying obligation is to
notify ‘immediately’.
‘Immediate’ notification is that which allows the
Committee on Safeguards, and Members, the fullest possible period to
reflect upon and react to an ongoing safeguard investigation. Anything
less than ‘immediate’ notification curtails this period. We do not,
therefore, agree … that the requirement of ‘immediate’
notification is satisfied as long as the Committee on Safeguards and
Members of the WTO have sufficient time to review that notification. In
our view, whether a Member has made an ‘immediate’ notification does
not depend on evidence as to how the Committee on Safeguards and
individual Members of the WTO actually use that notification. Nor can
the requirement of ‘immediate’ notification depend on an ex post
facto assessment of whether individual Members suffered actual prejudice
through an insufficiency in the notification period.”(418)
(i) “Immediate”
notification under Article 12.1(a)
249.
Two panels have had the opportunity to make
findings on whether notifications have amounted to “immediate”
notifications under Article 12.1.(a). In Korea
— Dairy, the Panel
found that:
“[T]he 14-day period between Korea’s initiation
of the investigation and its presentation of the notification related
thereto, does not respect the requirements for ‘immediate’
notification and is in violation of Article 12.1 of the Agreement on
Safeguards.”(419)
250.
Similarly, the Panel on US — Wheat Gluten
determined that:
“[T]he delay of 16 days between the initiation of
the investigation and the notification thereof does not satisfy the
requirement of immediate notification of Article 12.1(a) SA.”(420)
251.
The Appellate Body upheld the finding of the
Panel on US — Wheat Gluten, but did not pronounce itself on the Panel’s
determination in Korea — Dairy.(421)
(ii) “Immediate” notification under Article
12.1(b)
252.
In respect of a notification of a determination
of serious injury, the Panel on Korea — Dairy states:
“[A] delay of 40 days … between the domestic
publication of the injury finding and the date of that notification to
the Committee on Safeguards … does not satisfy the requirements for an
immediate notification and therefore is in violation of Article 12.1 of
the Agreement on Safeguards.” (422)
253.
The Panel on US — Wheat Gluten found that:
“[T]he delay of 26 days between the finding of
serious injury and the notification thereof does not satisfy the
requirement of immediate notification of Article 12.1(b) SA.”(423)
254.
The Appellate Body upheld the finding of the
Panel on US — Wheat Gluten, but did not pronounce itself on the Panel’s
determination on Korea — Dairy.(424)
(iii) “Immediate” notification under Article
12.1(c)
255.
As regards a notification of a proposed
safeguard measure, the Panel Report in Korea — Dairy stated:
“[W]e note that this notification took place more
than 6 weeks after the decision on the proposed measure was taken … We
consider that this delay does not meet the requirements for an ‘immediate’
notification and therefore is in violation of Article 12.1 of the
Agreement on Safeguards.”(425)
256.
In respect of a notification of a final decision
to take a safeguard measure, the Panel on Korea — Dairy stated:
“[W]e note that Korea notified on 24 March 1997
that on 1 March 1997 a final decision had been taken to impose a quota
as a safeguard measure. We fail to see how this can be viewed as an
immediate notification. As far as it covers Korea’s final decision to
take a safeguard measure, we find that the timing of the Korean
notification of 24 March 1997 does not meet the requirements of Article
12.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.”(426)
257.
The Appellate Body on US — Wheat Gluten
reversed a Panel finding that a notification of a decision to apply a
safeguard measure after the implementation of that decision was
inconsistent with Article 12.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards.(427) The
Panel had considered that Article 12.2 provides relevant context in
determining the timeliness of notifications under Article
12.1(c), and
reasoned that a notification under Article 12.1(c) must be of a “proposed
measure” and its “proposed date of introduction”. On this basis,
the Panel concluded that a notification under Article 12.1(c) must be
made before the implementation of the “proposed” safeguard measure.
The Appellate Body reasoned as follows:
“In examining the ordinary meaning of Article
12.1(c), we observe that the relevant triggering event is the ‘taking’
of a decision. To us, Article 12.1(c) is focused upon whether a ‘decision’
has occurred, or has been ‘taken’, and not on whether that decision
has been given effect. On the face of the text, the timeliness of a
notification under Article 12.1(c) depends only on whether the
notification was immediate.
…
Article 12.2 is related to, and complements,
Article
12.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards. Whereas Article 12.1 sets forth
when notifications must be made during an investigation, Article 12.2
clarifies what detailed information must be contained in the
notifications under Articles 12.1(b) and 12.1(c). We do not, however,
see the content requirements of Article 12.2 as prescribing when the
notification under 12.1(c) must take place. Rather, in our view,
timeliness under 12.1(c) is determined by whether a decision to apply or
extend a safeguard measure is notified ‘immediately’. A separate
question arises as to whether notifications made by the Member satisfy
the content requirements of Article 12.2. Answering this separate
question requires examination of whether, in its notifications under
either Article 12.1(b) or Article
12.1(c), the Member proposing to apply
a safeguard measure has notified ‘all pertinent information’,
including the ‘mandatory components’ specifically enumerated in
Article 12.2.”(428)
258.
The Appellate Body on US — Wheat Gluten then
found that although the obligations under Article
12.1(b), 12.1(c) and 12.2. were “related”, they constituted “discrete obligations”:
“Thus, the obligations set forth under Articles
12.1(b), 12.1(c) and 12.2 relate to different aspects of the
notification process. Although related, these obligations are discrete.
A Member could notify ‘all pertinent information’ in its Articles
12.1(b) and 12.1(c) notifications, and thereby satisfy
Article 12.2, but
still act inconsistently with Article 12.1 because the relevant
notifications were not made ‘immediately’. Similarly, a Member could
satisfy the Article 12.1 requirement of ‘immediate’ notification,
but act inconsistently with Article 12.2 if the content of its
notifications was deficient.
In our view, in finding that the United States acted
inconsistently with Article 12.1(c) solely because the decision to apply
a safeguard measure was notified after that decision had been
implemented, the Panel confused the separate obligations imposed on
Members pursuant to Article 12.1(c) and Article 12.2 and, thereby, added
another layer to the timeliness requirements in Article
12.1(c). Instead
of insisting on ‘immediate’ notification, as stipulated by Article
12.1(c), the Panel required notification to be made both ‘immediately’
and before implementation of the safeguard measure. We see no basis in
Article 12.1(c) for this conclusion.”(429)
259.
The Appellate Body on US — Wheat Gluten then
found that the notification at issue was consistent with the requirement
of immediate notification under Article 12.1(c). The United States had
made the notification only five days after the President of the United
States had “taken the decision” to apply the safeguard measure, a
period the Appellate Body considered sufficient, also taking into
account that the notification was made the day after the decision of the
President of the United States had been published in the United States
Federal Register.(430)
(b) Content of notifications under Article 12.1(a)
260.
At its meeting on 24 February 1995, the
Committee on Safeguards adopted a format for notifications under Article
12.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards on initiation of an investigation
and the reasons for it.(431) The Committee also adopted formats for
notifications required under Articles 12.1(b) and
(c).(432)
261.
At its meeting on 6 May 1996, the Committee on
Safeguards adopted a format for notification of termination of a
safeguards investigation where no safeguard measure is imposed.(433)
262.
The Panel on Korea — Dairy noted the limited
explicit requirements of Article 12.1(a) with respect to the content of
notifications:
“Regarding the ‘content’ of notifications under
Article 12.1, we note that with regard to the notification of the
initiation of an investigation, the terms of Article 12.1(a) only refer
to the obligation to notify ‘initiating an investigatory process
relating to serious injury or threat thereof and the reasons for it’.”(434)
263.
In examining the conformity with Article 12.1(a)
of the notification at issue, the Panel on Korea — Dairy rejected an
argument “that such notification should necessarily include a
discussion of all of the legal requirements for a safeguard action to be
taken such as a discussion of the conditions of the markets, etc.”:
“We note that initiation is the beginning of the
process, and the Agreement on Safeguards does not establish specific
standards for the decision to initiate, as do Article 5 of the Agreement
on the Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 and
Article 11 of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Thus, to require a
discussion in the notification of initiation of evidence regarding the
elements that must be found to exist to impose a measure at the end of
the investigation would impose a requirement at the initiation stage
that is not required by the Agreement on Safeguards itself. We note in
the first instance that whatever the relationship between the
requirements of Article 12.2 regarding the contents of notifications and
the contents of the investigation reports published pursuant to Articles
3.1 and 4.2, this question is not relevant to
Article 12.1(a)
notifications, as Article 12.2 specifically and exclusively addresses
‘notifications referred to in paragraphs [12.]1(b) and
[12.]1(c)’.
The format agreed by the Committee for notifications
under Article 12.1(a) is not legally binding, although helpful. The
guidance in the format is general as to the kind of information to be
provided, referring simply to examples of information on the reasons for
initiation, and saying nothing about the level of detail of that
information.
Although Korea’s notification could usefully have
included a reference to allegations of serious injury and a
cross-reference to any domestic publication(s) in Korea, we think that
this notification was sufficient to inform WTO Members adequately of
Korea’s initiation of an investigation concerning a particular
product, so that Members having an interest in the product could avail
themselves of their right to participate in the domestic investigation
process.”(435)
3. Article 12.2
(a) “all pertinent
information”
264.
The Panel on Korea — Dairy while analysing the
meaning of the expression “all pertinent information” in Article
12.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, inter alia, observed that the
standard of what must be notified to the Committee under Article 12 of
the Agreement on Safeguards differed from what must be published
domestically pursuant to Articles 3 and
4.(436) The Panel found that the
information contained in the notifications at issue was in conformity
with Article 12.2.(437) In respect of one of these notifications, the
Panel noted that “this notification contains sufficient information on
what Korea considered to be evidence of injury caused by increased
imports ….”(438) The Appellate Body, however, reversed the finding by
the Panel that a notification provided by Korea under Article 12.1(b) of
a determination of serious injury met the requirements of Article
12.2.(439) In this context, the Appellate Body interpreted
Article 12.2 as
follows:
“[I]tems listed … as mandatory components of ‘all
pertinent information’, constitute a minimum notification requirement
that must be met if a notification is to comply with the requirements of
Article 12.
We do not agree with the Panel that ‘evidence of
serious injury’ in Article 12.2 is determined by what the notifying
Member considers to be sufficient information. What constitutes ‘evidence
of serious injury’ is spelled out in Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement
on Safeguards…
…
We believe that ‘evidence of serious injury’ in
the sense of Article 12.2 should refer, at a minimum, to the injury
factors required to be evaluated under Article
4.2(a). In other words,
according to the text and the context of Article
12.2, a Member must, at
a minimum, address in its notifications, pursuant to paragraphs 1(b) and
1(c) of Article 12, all the items specified in Article 12.2 as
constituting ‘all pertinent information’, as well as the factors
listed in Article 4.2 that are required to be evaluated in a safeguards
investigation. We believe that the standard set by Article 12 with
respect to the content of ‘all pertinent information’ to be notified
to the Committee on Safeguards is an objective standard independent of
the subjective assessment of the notifying Member.”(440)
265.
While it had found that the standard for
determining “all pertinent information” could not be a subjective
assessment by the notifying Member, the Appellate Body in Korea — Dairy emphasized at the same time that it did not interpret “evidence
of serious injury” to mean that all details contained in the report of
the national authorities should be included:
“In concluding that there is a minimum objective
standard, we do not mean to suggest that ‘evidence of serious injury’
should include all the details of the recommendations and reasoning to
be found in the report of the competent authorities. We agree with the
Panel that, if such had been the intention of the drafters of the
Agreement on Safeguards, they would have simply referred back to
Articles 3 and 4 when requiring ‘evidence of serious injury’ in
Article 12.2. There is, however, an intermediate position between
notifying the full content of the report of the competent authorities
and giving the notifying Member the discretion to determine what may be
included in a notification. To comply with the requirements of Article
12.2, the notifications pursuant to paragraphs 1(b) and
1(c) of Article
12 must, at a minimum, address all the items specified in Article 12.2
as constituting ‘all pertinent information’, as well as the factors
listed in Article 4.2 that are required to be evaluated in a safeguards
investigation.
We are aware that the last sentence of Article 12.2
provides that the Council for Trade in Goods or the Committee on
Safeguards may request such additional information as they may consider
necessary from the Member proposing to apply a safeguard measure….
Contrary to what Korea argued and the Panel reasoned, such a request is
not meant to fill in gaps created by omitting elements required under
‘all relevant information’ or ‘evidence of serious injury’.”(441)
266.
The Appellate Body on Korea — Dairy
accordingly reversed the Panel on this point and made the following
concluding general statement regarding the object and purpose of the
notification requirements at issue:
“We believe that the purpose of notification is
better served if it includes all the elements of information specified
in Articles 12.2 and 4.2. In this way, exporting Members with a
substantial interest in the product subject to a safeguard measure will
be in a better position to engage in meaningful consultations, as
envisaged by Article 12.3, than they would otherwise be if the
notification did not include all such elements. And, the Committee on
Safeguards can more effectively carry out its surveillance function set
out in Article 13 of the Agreement on Safeguards. At the same time,
providing the requisite information to the Committee on Safeguards does
not place an excessive burden on a Member proposing to apply a safeguard
measure as such information is, or should be, readily available to it.”(442)
(b) Notification of a proposed safeguard measure
267.
The Panel on Korea — Dairy found that Article
12.1, 12.2 and 12.3, taken together, impose the obligation upon a Member
to notify the details of a proposed safeguard measure before it is
applied, so that affected Members may consult about it before it takes
effect.(443)
268.
The Appellate Body Report on US — Wheat Gluten
subsequently found to the contrary. See paragraphs 257–259
above.
4. Article 12.3
(a) “adequate opportunity for prior
consultations”
269.
The Panel on Korea — Dairy rejected a claim
that, by not providing “all pertinent information” in its
notifications in advance of consultations, a Member had failed to
provide “adequate opportunity for prior consultations” within the
meaning of Article 12.3. The Panel had found the content of Korea’s
notifications in conformity with Article 12 (the Appellate Body
subsequently reversed this latter finding, but did not address any of
the following issues). The Panel then opined that consultations may be
“adequate” even if prior notifications are incomplete,(444) since it
considered that one of the purposes of consultations is to review the
content of the relevant notifications. The Panel further noted that
whether parties eventually reach a mutually agreed solution is not the
only criterion for assessing the adequacy of consultations:(445)
“In the present case we note that parties exchanged
questions and answers. The European Communities claims that it has
always been unsatisfied with the Koreans’ answers and notifications
(together with Korea’s determination). This may be the case and would
explain why it decided to pursue dispute settlement proceedings, but it
does not prove that Korea did not consult in good faith for the purpose
of informing interested Members of its investigation, its conclusion and
its proposed actions. We note also that Korea did impose a measure at a
level and for a duration different, and less restrictive, than initially
proposed. Consultations were certainly fruitful in this respect, albeit
not sufficient to satisfy the European Communities.
We reject therefore the EC claim that Korea failed to
provide adequate opportunity to consult. Moreover, it seems to us that
such consultations have led to an important revision of the initial
notification and that parties, at some point, entered into very serious
negotiations and considered serious elements of a mutually agreed
solution. The fact that this proposed settlement was not formalized
through the acceptance by the relevant internal authorities of the
European Communities is immaterial. What is relevant for the purpose of
this EC claim, is the fact that the parties to these consultations were
able to negotiate quite effectively, which, in our view, demonstrates
that the consultations were adequate. For us, this is the purpose of any
consultation process and the scope of the obligation contained in
Article 12.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards, i.e. to favour efforts by
the parties to reach a mutually agreed solution of their disagreement.”(446)
270.
In US — Wheat Gluten, the Appellate Body held
that the Panel had erred in concluding that the United States had acted
inconsistently with Article 12.3 insofar as the Panel had based this
conclusion on an erroneous interpretation of Article
12.1(c),(447) but
upheld the finding on the basis that there had been no opportunity for
consultations on the final proposed measure. In this connection, the
Appellate Body first considered that Article 12.3 provides that
information on a proposed measure must be provided in advance of the
consultation:
“We note, first, that Article 12.3 requires a
Member proposing to apply a safeguard measure to provide an ‘adequate
opportunity for prior consultations’ with Members with a substantial
interest in exporting the product concerned. Article 12.3 states that an
‘adequate opportunity’ for consultations is to be provided ‘with a
view to’: reviewing the information furnished pursuant to Article 12.2; exchanging views on the measure; and reaching an understanding
with exporting Members on an equivalent level of concessions. In view of
these objectives, we consider that Article 12.3 requires a Member
proposing to apply a safeguard measure to provide exporting Members with
sufficient information and time to allow for the possibility, through
consultations, for a meaningful exchange on the issues identified. To
us, it follows from the text of Article 12.3 itself that information on
the proposed measure must be provided in advance of the consultations,
so that the consultations can adequately address that measure. Moreover,
the reference, in Article 12.3, to ‘the information provided under’
Article 12.2, indicates that Article 12.2 identifies the information
that is needed to enable meaningful consultations to occur under Article
12.3. Among the list of ‘mandatory components’ regarding information
identified in Article 12.2 are: a precise description of the proposed
measure, and its proposed date of introduction.
Thus, in our view, an exporting Member will not have
an ‘adequate opportunity’ under Article 12.3 to negotiate overall
equivalent concessions through consultations unless, prior to those
consultations, it has obtained, inter alia, sufficiently detailed
information on the form of the proposed measure, including the nature of
the remedy.”(448)
271.
The Panel on US — Wheat Gluten had found that
no consultations had been held between the United States and the
European Communities on the final measure that was approved by the
President of the United States.(449) The Appellate Body noted:
“[T]he USITC Report set out a number of ‘recommendations’
to the President of the United States …
We note that the recommendations made by the USITC
did not include specific numerical quota shares for the individual
exporting Members concerned, and the recommendations imply, without
providing details, that the individual quota shares could be less
favourable to imports from the European Communities. We consider that
these ‘recommendations’ did not allow the European Communities to
assess accurately the likely impact of the measure being contemplated,
nor to consult adequately on overall equivalent concessions with the
United States.
Accordingly, we see no error in the Panel’s
conclusion that the United States notifications under Article 12.1(b)
did not provide a description of the measure under consideration
sufficiently precise as to allow the European Communities to conduct
meaningful consultations with the United States, as required by Article
12.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards.(450)”(451)
272.
The Appellate Body on US — Line Pipe
reaffirmed its interpretation in US — Wheat Gluten that the
appropriate inquiry for the obligation to provide adequate opportunity
for prior consultation is whether the importing Member provided the
exporting Members with “sufficient time” to allow for a “meaningful
exchange” on the information and that the amount of time needed for a
meaningful exchange must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.(452) The
Appellate Body also found that failure of the exporting Member to
request consultations during an inadequate time period does not excuse
the importing Member’s obligation to provide adequate opportunity for
prior consultation:
“The obligation of an importing Member under
Article 12.3 is to ‘provide adequate opportunity for prior
consultations’. (emphasis added) That obligation cannot be met if
there is insufficient time prior to the application of the measure to
have a meaningful exchange. The importing Member’s failure to provide
information about a safeguard measure to an exporting Member
sufficiently in advance of that measure taking effect is not excused by
the fact that the exporting Member did not request consultations during
that inadequate time-period.”(453)
5. Relationship with other Articles
(a) Articles 2 and 4
273.
The Panel on Argentina — Footwear (EC)
rejected the view that non-compliance with Article 12 ipso facto
constitutes a basis for finding a violation of the substantive
requirements of Articles 2 and
4, and vice versa:
“In our view, the notification requirements of
Article 12 are separate from, and in themselves do not have implications
for, the question of substantive compliance with Articles 2 and
4.
Similarly, we consider that the substantive requirements of Articles 2
and 4 do not have implications for the question of compliance with
Article 12. Article 12 serves to provide transparency and information
concerning the safeguard-related actions taken by Members. We note in
this context that notification under Article 12 is just the first step
in a process of transparency that can include, inter alia, review by the
Committee as part of its surveillance functions (Article 13.1(f)),
requests for additional information by the Council for Trade in Goods or
the Committee on Safeguards (Article 12.2), and/or eventual bilateral
consultations with affected Members if application of a measure is
proposed (Article 12.3). In this regard, the important point is that the
notifications be sufficiently descriptive of the actions that have been
taken or are proposed to be taken, and of the basis for those actions,
that Members with an interest in the matter can decide whether and how
to pursue it further.
…
Articles 12.2 and 12.3 in our view confirm that
Members are not required to notify the full detail of their
investigations and findings. Article 12.2 specifically provides for the
possibility of requests for further information by the Council for Trade
in Goods or the Committee on Safeguards. Article 12.3 provides, inter
alia, for consultations, upon request, with other Members, to review the
information contained in the notifications. Thus, these provisions
specifically create opportunities for further information to be
provided, upon request, concerning the details of the actions summarised
in the notifications. Ultimately, should a violation of Articles 2 and
4
be alleged, it would be the more detailed information from the record of
the investigation, and in particular the published report(s) on the
findings and reasoned conclusions of that investigation, that would form
the basis for evaluation of such an allegation.”(454)
274.
In Korea — Dairy, the Appellate Body
interpreted the notification requirement of “all pertinent information”
as requiring a “minimum objective standard” for such notification so
as to reflect “an intermediate position between notifying the full
content of the report of the competent authorities and giving the
notifying Member the discretion to determine what may be included in a
notification”. The Appellate Body specifically identified the
mandatory factors of all pertinent information as well as factors listed
in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards that should be covered in
the notification:
“In order to determine the appropriate meaning of
‘all pertinent information’, we must examine this phrase in the
light of the text and the context of Article 12 as well as the object
and purpose of that Article. The text of Article 12.2 makes it clear
that a Member proposing to apply a safeguard measure is required to
provide the Committee on Safeguards with all pertinent, not just
any
pertinent, information. Moreover, it provides that such information
shall include certain items listed immediately after the phrase ‘all
pertinent information’, namely, evidence of serious injury or threat
thereof caused by increased imports, a precise description of the
product involved and the proposed measure, the proposed date of
introduction, the expected duration of the measure and a timetable for
progressive liberalization. These items, which are listed as mandatory
components of ‘all pertinent information’, constitute a minimum
notification requirement that must be met if a notification is to comply
with the requirements of Article 12.
We do not agree with the Panel that ‘evidence of
serious injury’ in Article 12.2 is determined by what the notifying
Member considers to be sufficient information. What constitutes ‘evidence
of serious injury’ is spelled out in Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement
on Safeguards which provides:
‘… the competent authorities shall evaluate all
relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a
bearing on the situation of that industry, in particular, the rate and
amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute
and relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased
imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity,
capacity utilization, profits and losses, and employment.’
We believe that ‘evidence of serious injury’ in
the sense of Article 12.2 should refer, at a minimum, to the injury
factors required to be evaluated under Article 4.2(a). In other words,
according to the text and the context of Article
12.2, a Member must, at
a minimum, address in its notifications, pursuant to paragraphs 1(b) and
1(c) of Article 12, all the items specified in Article 12.2 as
constituting ‘all pertinent information’, as well as the factors
listed in Article 4.2 that are required to be evaluated in a safeguards
investigation. We believe that the standard set by Article 12 with
respect to the content of ‘all pertinent information’ to be notified
to the Committee on Safeguards is an objective standard independent of
the subjective assessment of the notifying Member.
In concluding that there is a minimum objective
standard, we do not mean to suggest that ‘evidence of serious injury’
should include all the details of the recommendations and reasoning to
be found in the report of the competent authorities. We agree with the
Panel that, if such had been the intention of the drafters of the
Agreement on Safeguards, they would have simply referred back to
Articles 3 and 4 when requiring ‘evidence of serious injury’ in
Article 12.2. There is, however, an intermediate position between
notifying the full content of the report of the competent authorities
and giving the notifying Member the discretion to determine what may be
included in a notification. To comply with the requirements of Article
12.2, the notifications pursuant to paragraphs 1(b) and
1(c) of Article
12 must, at a minimum, address all the items specified in Article 12.2
as constituting ‘all pertinent information’, as well as the factors
listed in Article 4.2 that are required to be evaluated in a safeguards
investigation.”(455)
(b) Article 7
275.
The Panel on Argentina — Footwear (EC)
concluded that it could not examine under Article 12 a claim regarding a
failure to notify a modification of a safeguard measure that increased
the restrictiveness of that measure:
“We note that the modifications of definitive
safeguard measures foreseen in the Agreement (namely early elimination
or faster liberalization potentially resulting from mid-term reviews
under Article 7.4, and extension of measures beyond the initial period
of application under Article 7. [sic] and
7.4), all are subject to
notification requirements under Articles 12.5 and
12.1(c)/12.2,
respectively.
In this context, we note that the only modifications
of safeguard measures that Article 7.4 contemplates are those that
reduce its restrictiveness (i.e., to eliminate the measure or to
increase the pace of its liberalisation pursuant to a mid-term review).
The Agreement does not contemplate modifications that increase the
restrictiveness of a measure, and thus contains no notification
requirement for such restrictive modifications.
We note that the modifications of the definitive
safeguard measure made by Argentina are not contemplated by Article
7,
and thus Article 12 does not foresee notification requirements with
respect to such modifications. Any substantive issues pertaining to
these subsequent Resolutions would need to be addressed under Article
7,
but the European Communities made no such claim. Where the situation at
issue is primarily one of substance, i.e., modification of a measure in
a way not foreseen by the Safeguards Agreement, we believe that we
cannot address the alleged procedural violation concerning notification
arising therefrom, as no explicit procedural obligation is foreseen.
Therefore, we see no possibility for a ruling on this aspect of the
European Communities’ claim under Article 12.”(456)
6. Article 12.6
276.
At its meeting of 24 February 1995, the
Committee adopted a format for notifications of laws, regulations and
administrative procedures relating to safeguard measures.(457) Further,
the Committee decided that all Members that had available relevant
legislation and/or regulations which apply to safeguard measures covered
by the Agreement should notify the full and integrated text of that
legislation and/or those regulations to the Committee by 15 March 1995,
with the understanding that if such legislation and/or regulations did
not exist or were not yet available, the Member would inform the
Committee of this fact, would explain the reasons therefor, and would
provide an indicative date by which time a notification was expected.(458)
Also, the Committee decided that notification of modifications to
legislation should be submitted within 30 days after domestic
publication of the modifications, with the understanding that if the
deadline could not be met, the reason would be notified by the deadline,
with an indication of when the modification would be notified.(459)
277.
At its meeting on 6 May 1996, the Committee on
Safeguards adopted procedures for future reviews of legislative
notifications.(460)
278.
As of 31 December 2004, 133 Members(461) had
notified the Committee on Safeguards of their domestic safeguards
legislation and/or regulations or made communications in this regard to
the Committee. (462),
(463) Thirty-one Members had not, as of that date,
made such a notification. The extent of the non-compliance with this
notification obligation, and the implications of this situation, were
raised by the Chairman at the regular meetings of the Committee.(464)
7. Article 12.7
279.
At its meeting on 24 February 1995, the
Committee on Safeguards decided that the information required in the
notifications under Article 12.7 of the Agreement on Safeguards should
also be provided by signatories that were eligible to become original
Members of the WTO within the same time-limits as those which apply to
WTO Members.(465)
280.
At its meeting on 24 February 1995, the
Committee on Safeguards adopted a format for notifications of
pre-existing Article XIX measures described in
Article 10.(466) At the
same meeting, the Committee also adopted a format for notifications of
measures subject to the prohibition and elimination of certain measures
under Article 11.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.(467) With respect to
reporting by Members regarding their progress in phasing out the
pre-existing Article XIX measures and measures prohibited under
Article 11, see paragraph 283
below.
XIV. Article 13 back to top
A. Text of Article 13
Article 13: Surveillance
1.
A Committee on Safeguards is hereby established,
under the authority of the Council for Trade in Goods, which shall be
open to the participation of any Member indicating its wish to serve on
it. The Committee will have the following functions:
(a)
to monitor, and report annually to the Council
for Trade in Goods on, the general implementation of this Agreement and
make recommendations towards its improvement;
(b)
to find, upon request of an affected Member,
whether or not the procedural requirements of this Agreement have been
complied with in connection with a safeguard measure, and report its
findings to the Council for Trade in Goods;
(c)
to assist Members, if they so request, in their
consultations under the provisions of this Agreement;
(d)
to examine measures covered by Article 10 and
paragraph 1 of Article 11, monitor the phase-out of such measures and
report as appropriate to the Council for Trade in Goods;
(e)
to review, at the request of the Member taking a
safeguard measure, whether proposals to suspend concessions or other
obligations are “substantially equivalent”, and report as
appropriate to the Council for Trade in Goods;
(f)
to receive and review all notifications provided
for in this Agreement and report as appropriate to the Council for Trade
in Goods; and
(g)
to perform any other function connected with this
Agreement that the Council for Trade in Goods may determine.
2.
To assist the Committee in carrying out its
surveillance function, the Secretariat shall prepare annually a factual
report on the operation of this Agreement based on notifications and
other reliable information available to it.
B. Interpretation and Application of Article
13
1. General
(a) Rules of procedure
281.
At its meeting on 6 May 1996, the Committee on
Safeguards adopted rules of procedure for its meetings, based on the
rules of the General Council and the Council for Trade in Goods, and
incorporating relevant changes to make them applicable to the Committee.(468) The Council for Trade in Goods subsequently approved the
Committee’s rules of procedure at its meeting of 22 May 1996.(469)
(b) Observers
282.
At its meeting on 24 February 1995, the
Committee on Safeguards decided that observer governments should provide
the Committee with any information the observer government considers
relevant to matters within the purview of the Agreement, including the
text of laws and regulations regarding safeguard measures, and
information regarding any safeguard measures taken by the observer
government.(470)
2. Article 13.1
283.
At its meeting on 24 February 1995, the
Committee on Safeguards agreed that, in order to perform the task under
Article 13.1(d), Members be asked to report at the end of each year on
their progress in phasing out pre-existing Article XIX measures and
measures subject to prohibition and elimination under Article 11.1 of
the Agreement.(471)
284.
At its meeting on 6 November 1995, the Committee
on Safeguards decided that, in order to comply with the provisions of
Articles 13.1 (b), (c) and (e), under which the Committee has to provide
assistance to Members upon request, the Committee would address these
matters on an ad hoc basis, if and when a request in these matters is
received, rather than attempt to establish a procedure in advance of any
requests for assistance.(472)
XV. Article 14 back to top
A. Text of
Article 14
Article 14: Dispute Settlement
The provisions of Articles XXII and
XXIII of GATT
1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding
shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes arising
under this Agreement.
B. Interpretation and Application of Article
14
285.
The following table lists the disputes in which
panel and/or Appellate Body reports have been adopted where the
provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards were invoked:
| |
Case Name |
Case Number |
Invoked Articles |
|
1 |
Korea — Dairy |
WT/DS98 |
Articles 2.1, 4.2(a), 4.2(b), 5.1 and 12.1–12.3 |
|
2 |
Argentina — Footwear (EC) |
WT/DS121 |
Articles 2.1, 4.2(a), (EC) 4.2(b), 5.1, 6, 12.1
and 12.2 |
|
3 |
US — Wheat Gluten |
WT/DS166 |
Articles 2.1, 4.2(a), 4.2(b), 8.1, 12.1(a),
12.1(b), 12.1(c), 12.2 and 12.3 |
|
4 |
US — Lamb |
WT/DS177,
WT/DS178 |
Articles 2.2, 3.1, 4.1, 4.1(a), 4.1(b), 4.2,
4.2(a), 8.1, 11.1(a), 12.2 and 12.6 |
|
5 |
US — Line Pipe |
WT/DS202 |
Articles 2, 2.1, 2.2, 3, 3.1, 4, 4.1(b),
4.1(c), 4.2(a), 4.2(b), 4.2(c), 5, 5.1, 7, 7.1, 8, 8.1, 9, 9.1,
11, 12.1, 12.3, 14 |
|
6 |
Chile — Price System Band |
WT/DS207 |
Articles 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1(a), 4.1(b),
4.2(a), 4.2(b), 4.2(c), 5.1, 6, 7, 12 |
|
7 |
Argentina — Preserved Peaches |
WT/DS238 |
Article 2.1, 3.1,
4.1(b), 4.2(a), 4.2(b), 5.1, and 12.2 |
|
8 |
US — Steel Safeguards |
WT/DS248,
WT/DS249,
WT/DS251,
WT/DS252,
WT/DS253,
WT/DS254,
WT/DS258,
WT/DS259 |
Article 2.1, 2.2, 3, 3.1, 4.2(a), 4.2(b),
4.1(c), 5.1, 5.2, 7.1, 8.1, 9.1, 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 |
XVI. Annex
back to top
A. Text of the Annex
Annex: Exception Referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 11
|
Members concerned |
Product |
Termination |
|
EC/Japan |
Passenger cars, off road 1999
vehicles, light commercial vehicles, light trucks (up to 5
tonnes), and the same vehicles in wholly knocked-down form (CKD
sets). |
31 December |
B. Interpretation and
Application of the Annex
No jurisprudence or decision by a competent WTO body.
XVII. Status of
Safeguards Legislative Notifications back to top
— Notification accompanied with the mark * is a “nil”
notification.
— “None” means that no notification has been
submitted.
— This annual report includes a period when Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia were not Member States of the European Communities
(i.e. prior to May 2004), as well as a period following the accession of
these countries to the European Communities. Therefore, these Members’
separate notifications are listed herein. See document
G/SG/N/1/EEC/1/Suppl.2 for updated information on the current status of laws and
regulations of the above-mentioned countries.
Footnotes:
407. Panel Report on US — Lamb, para. 7.280.
back to text
408. Panel Report on US — Lamb, para. 7.280.
back to text
409. G/SG/M/1, Section E. With respect to the clarification made by the Chairman concerning the implication of the decision, see
G/SG/M/1, para. 28.
back to text
410. G/SG/M/1, Section H. The text of the adopted format can be found in G/SG/N/4.
back to text
411. G/SG/M/1, Section H. The text of the adopted format can be found in G/SG/N/5.
back to text
412. G/SG/1. back to text
413. Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, para. 7.116.
back to text
414. (footnote original) The New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary defines immediately as
“without delay, straightaway”; the New Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines it as
“without delay, at once, instantly”.
back to text
415. Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, para. 7.128.
back to text
416. Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, para. 7.134.
back to text
417. Panel Report on US — Wheat
Gluten, para. 8.194.
back to text
418. Appellate Body Report on US —
Wheat Gluten, paras. 105–106.
back to text
419. Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, para. 7.134.
back to text
420. Panel Report on US — Wheat
Gluten, para. 8.197.
back to text
421. Appellate Body Report on US —
Wheat Gluten, para. 112.
back to text
422. Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, para. 7.137.
back to text
423. Panel Report on US — Wheat
Gluten, para. 8.199.
back to text
424. Appellate Body Report on US —
Wheat Gluten, para. 116.
back to text
425. Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, para. 7.140.
back to text
426. Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, para. 7.145.
back to text
427. Panel Report on US — Wheat
Gluten, paras. 8.200–8.207.
back to text
428. Appellate Body Report on US —
Wheat Gluten, paras. 120 and 123.
back to text
429. Appellate Body Report on US —
Wheat Gluten, paras. 124–125.
back to text
430. Appellate Body Report on US —
Wheat Gluten, paras. 128–130.
back to text
431. G/SG/M/1, Section H. The text of the adopted format can be found in G/SG/N/6.
back to text
432. G/SG/M/1, Section H. The text of the adopted format can be found in G/SG/W/1, Annex, Item VI.
back to text
433. G/SG/M/6, Section C. The text of the adopted format can be found in G/SG/2.
back to text
434. Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, para. 7.122.
back to text
435. Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, paras. 7.131–7.133.
back to text
436. Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, paras. 7.125–7.127.
back to text
437. Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, paras. 7.136, 7.139 and 7.144.
back to text
438. Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, para. 7.136.
back to text
439. Appellate Body Report on Korea
— Dairy, para. 113.
back to text
440. Appellate Body Report on Korea
— Dairy, paras. 107–108.
back to text
441. Appellate Body Report on Korea
— Dairy, paras. 109–110.
back to text
442. Appellate Body Report on Korea
— Dairy, para. 111.
back to text
443. See Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, para. 7.120.
back to text
444. Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, para. 7.150.
back to text
445. Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, para. 7.151.
back to text
446. Panel Report on Korea — Dairy, paras. 7.152–7.153.
back to text
447. Appellate Body Report on US —
Wheat Gluten, para. 133.
back to text
448. Appellate Body Report on US —
Wheat Gluten, paras. 136–137.
back to text
449. Panel Report on US — Wheat
Gluten, para. 8.217.
back to text
450. (footnote original) We note that, in so finding, we do not consider it necessary to determine whether the United States notified a
“proposed measure” to the European Communities as required by
Article 12.2 of the
Agreement on Safeguards, as the European Communities did not argue specifically that the United States had acted inconsistently with
Article 12.2.
back to text
451. Appellate Body Report on US —
Wheat Gluten, paras. 140–142.
back to text
452. Appellate Body Report on US —
Line Pipe, para. 107. In particular, the Appellate Body addressed the issue whether the period from the initial
Article 12.1(b) notification to the day the measure takes effect is relevant for assessing whether an adequate opportunity was provided for prior consultations. The Appellate Body found that notifications under
Article 12.1(b) in this case were not sufficiently precise to allow the exporting Member to conduct meaningful consultation on the measure at issue. The Appellate Body concurred with the Panel’s finding, that, as a matter of fact, these proposed measures
“differed substantially” from the one announced and eventually
applied in
US — Line Pipe.
back to text
453. Appellate Body Report on US —
Line Pipe, para. 112.
back to text
454. Panel Report on Argentina — Footwear
(EC), paras. 8.298 and 8.300.
back to text
455. Appellate Body Report on Korea
— Dairy, paras. 107–109.
back to text
456. Panel Report on Argentina — Footwear
(EC), paras. 8.302–8.304.
back to text
457. G/SG/M/1, Section H. The text of the adopted format can be found in
G/SG/N/1. The Committee agreed that these notifications would be distributed as unrestricted documents.
G/SG/M/1, Section I, paras. 37–38.
back to text
458. G/SG/M/1, Section I, paras. 64–65.
back to text
459. G/SG/M/1, Section I, paras. 64–65.
back to text
460. G/SG/M/6, Section G. The text of the adopted format can be found in G/SG/W/116.
back to text
461. There are currently 149 WTO Members, counting the EC and all its Member States separately. This figure is reduced to 124 if the EC and its 25 Member States are counted as a single Member.
back to text
462. G/SG/N/1 and addenda. back to text
463. Section XVIII of this Chapter lists the status of notifications under
Article 12.6 of the Agreement.
back to text
464. G/SG/M/25 and G/SG/M/26. back to text
465. G/SG/M/1, Section E. With respect to the clarification made by the Chairman concerning the implication of the decision, see
G/SG/M/1, para. 28.
back to text
466. G/SG/M/1. Section H. The text of the adopted format can be found in G/SG/N/2.
back to text
467. G/SG/M/1, Section H. The text of the adopted format can be found in G/SG/N/3.
back to text
468. G/SG/M/6, Section I. The text of the adopted document can be found in G/SG/4.
back to text
469. G/C/M/10, Section 1. back to text
470. G/SG/M/1, Section F. back to text
471. G/SG/M/1, Section J. back to text
472. G/SG/M/3, Section E.
back to text
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