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I. Preamble back to top
A. Text of the Preamble
Members,
Having regard to the Multilateral Trade Negotiations;
Desiring to further the objectives of GATT 1994;
Taking into account the particular trade, development and
financial needs of developing country Members;
Recognizing the usefulness of automatic import licensing for
certain purposes and that such licensing should not be used to restrict
trade;
Recognizing that import licensing may be employed to administer
measures such as those adopted pursuant to the relevant provisions of
GATT 1994;
Recognizing the provisions of GATT 1994 as they apply to import
licensing procedures;
Desiring to ensure that import licensing procedures are not
utilized in a manner contrary to the principles and obligations of GATT
1994;
Recognizing that the flow of international trade could be impeded
by the inappropriate use of import licensing procedures;
Convinced that import licensing, particularly non-automatic
import licensing, should be implemented in a transparent and predictable
manner;
Recognizing that non-automatic licensing procedures should be no
more administratively burdensome than absolutely necessary to administer
the relevant measure;
Desiring to simplify, and bring transparency to, the
administrative procedures and practices used in international trade, and
to ensure the fair and equitable application and administration of such
procedures and practices;
Desiring to provide for a consultative mechanism and the speedy,
effective and equitable resolution of disputes arising under this
Agreement;
Hereby agree as follows:
B. Interpretation and Application of the Preamble
1. In EC
—
Poultry, Brazil argued before the
Appellate Body that Articles 1.2 and 3.2 of the
Licensing Agreement were
not applicable to over-quota trade. In addressing these issues, the
Appellate Body referred to the Preamble of the Licensing Agreement:
“The preamble to the Licensing Agreement stresses that the
Agreement aims at ensuring that import licensing procedures ‘are not
utilized in a manner contrary to the principles and obligations of GATT
1994’ and are ‘implemented in a transparent and predictable manner’.”(1)
II. Article 1
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A. Text of Article 1
Article 1: General Provisions
1. For the purpose of this Agreement, import licensing is defined as
administrative procedures(1) used for the operation of import licensing
regimes requiring the submission of an application or other
documentation (other than that required for customs purposes) to the
relevant administrative body as a prior condition for importation into
the customs territory of the importing Member.
(footnote original)
1 Those procedures referred to as “licensing”
as well as other similar administrative procedures.
2. Members shall ensure that the administrative procedures used to
implement import licensing regimes are in conformity with the relevant
provisions of GATT 1994 including its annexes and protocols, as
interpreted by this Agreement, with a view to preventing trade
distortions that may arise from an inappropriate operation of those
procedures, taking into account the economic development purposes and
financial and trade needs of developing country Members.(2)
(footnote original)
2 Nothing in this Agreement shall be taken
as implying that the basis, scope or duration of a measure being
implemented by a licensing procedure is subject to question under this
Agreement.
3. The rules for import licensing procedures shall be neutral in
application and administered in a fair and equitable manner.
4. (a) The rules and all information concerning procedures for the
submission of applications, including the eligibility of persons, firms
and institutions to make such applications, the administrative body(ies)
to be approached, and the lists of products subject to the licensing
requirement shall be published, in the sources notified to the Committee
on Import Licensing provided for in Article 4
(referred to in this
Agreement as “the Committee”), in such a manner as to enable
governments(3) and traders to become acquainted with them. Such
publication shall take place, whenever practicable, 21 days prior to the
effective date of the requirement but in all events not later than such
effective date. Any exception, derogations or changes in or from the
rules concerning licensing procedures or the list of products subject to
import licensing shall also be published in the same manner and within
the same time periods as specified above. Copies of these publications
shall also be made available to the Secretariat.
(footnote original)
3 For the purpose of this Agreement, the
term “governments” is deemed to include the competent authorities of
the European Communities.
(b) Members which wish to make comments in writing shall be provided
the opportunity to discuss these comments upon request. The concerned
Member shall give due consideration to these comments and results of
discussion.
5. Application forms and, where applicable, renewal forms shall be as
simple as possible. Such documents and information as are considered
strictly necessary for the proper functioning of the licensing regime
may be required on application.
6. Application procedures and, where applicable, renewal procedures
shall be as simple as possible. Applicants shall be allowed a reasonable
period for the submission of licence applications. Where there is a
closing date, this period should be at least 21 days with provision for
extension in circumstances where insufficient applications have been
received within this period. Applicants shall have to approach only one
administrative body in connection with an application. Where it is
strictly indispensable to approach more than one administrative body,
applicants shall not need to approach more than three administrative
bodies.
7. No application shall be refused for minor documentation errors
which do not alter basic data contained therein. No penalty greater than
necessary to serve merely as a warning shall be imposed in respect of
any omission or mistake in documentation or procedures which is
obviously made without fraudulent intent or gross negligence.
8. Licensed imports shall not be refused for minor variations in
value, quantity or weight from the amount designated on the licence due
to differences occurring during shipment, differences incidental to bulk
loading and other minor differences consistent with normal commercial
practice.
9. The foreign exchange necessary to pay for licensed imports shall
be made available to licence holders on the same basis as to importers
of goods not requiring import licences.
10. With regard to security exceptions, the provisions of
Article XXI of GATT 1994 apply.
11. The provisions of this Agreement shall not require any Member to
disclose confidential information which would impede law enforcement or
otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the
legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or
private.
B. Interpretation and Application of Article 1
1. Article 1
(a) Scope of the Licensing Agreement
(i) Application of the Licensing Agreement to tariff quota procedures
2. In EC
—
Bananas III, the Appellate Body
interpreted the definition of “import licensing” set out in Article
1.1 and determined that procedures for tariff quotas that involve an
application for a licence, such as the EC tariff quota procedures at
issue, fell under the provisions of the Licensing Agreement:
“Although the precise terms of Article
1.1 do not say explicitly
that licensing procedures for tariff quotas are within the scope of the
Licensing Agreement, a careful reading of that provision leads
inescapably to that conclusion. The EC import licensing procedures
require ‘the submission of an application’ for import licences as
‘a prior condition for importation’ of a product at the lower,
in-quota tariff rate. The fact that the importation of that product is
possible at a high out-of-quota tariff rate without a licence does not
alter the fact that a licence is required for importation at the lower
in-quota tariff rate.
We note that Article 3.2 of the Licensing
Agreement provides that:
‘Non-automatic licensing shall not have trade-restrictive or -distortive
effects on imports additional to those caused by the imposition of the
restriction.’ (emphasis added)
We note also that Article
3.3 of the Licensing Agreement reads:
‘In the case of licensing requirements for purposes other than
the implementation of quantitative restrictions, Members shall
publish sufficient information for other Members and traders to know the
basis for granting and/or allocating licences.’ (emphasis added)
We see no reason to exclude import licensing procedures for the
administration of tariff quotas from the scope of the Licensing
Agreement on the basis of the use of the term ‘restriction’ in Article 3.2. We agree with the Panel that, in the light of the language
of Article 3.3 of the Licensing Agreement
and the introductory words of Article XI of the GATT
1994, the term ‘restriction’ as used in Article 3.2
should not be interpreted to encompass only quantitative
restrictions, but should be read also to include tariff quotas.
For these reasons, we agree with the Panel that import licensing
procedures for tariff quotas are within the scope of the Licensing
Agreement.”(2)
(ii) Application of the Licensing Agreement to trade outside the
scope of import licensing
3. The dispute in EC
—
Poultry concerned two EC
regulations: one that opened a tariff quota for frozen poultry meat and
a second (Regulation 1434/94) that provided rules governing
administration of the tariff quota, and applied only to in-quota trade
in frozen poultry meat. The Panel had found that “the Licensing
Agreement, as applied to this particular case, only relates to in-quota
trade.”(3) Brazil argued that nothing in the text or context of
Articles 1.2 and 3.2 of the Licensing Agreement
limits to in-quota trade the
requirement in Article 1.2 that licensing systems be implemented “with
a view to preventing trade distortions” or the prohibition in Article
3.2 of additional trade-restrictive or trade-distortive effects. The
Appellate Body stated as follows:
“The preamble to the Licensing Agreement
stresses that the
Agreement aims at ensuring that import licensing procedures ‘are not
utilized in a manner contrary to the principles and obligations of GATT
1994’ and are ‘implemented in a transparent and predictable manner’.
Moreover, Articles 1.2 and
3.2 make it clear that the Licensing
Agreement is also concerned, with, among other things, preventing trade
distortions that may be caused by licensing procedures. It follows that
wherever an import licensing regime is applied, these requirements must
be observed. The requirement to prevent trade distortion found in Articles 1.2 and 3.2 of the Licensing
Agreement refers to any trade
distortion that may be caused by the introduction or operation of
licensing procedures, and is not necessarily limited to that part of
trade to which the licensing procedures themselves apply. There may be
situations where the operation of licensing procedures, in fact, has
restrictive or distortive effects on that part of trade that is not
strictly subject to those procedures.
In the case before us, the licensing procedure established in
Article 1 of Regulation 1431/94 applies, by its terms, only to in-quota trade in
frozen poultry meat. No licensing is required by Regulation 1431/94 for
out-of-quota trade in frozen poultry meat. To the extent that the Panel
intended merely to reflect the fairly obvious fact that this licensing
procedure applies only to in-quota trade, we uphold the finding of the
Panel that ‘[t]he Licensing Agreement, as applied to this particular
case, only relates to in-quota trade’.”(4)
(iii) Import licensing rules versus administration of import
licensing régimes
4. In EC
—
Bananas III, the Appellate Body reversed
the Panel’s finding that Article 1.3 of the
Licensing Agreement “preclude[s]
the imposition of one system of import licensing procedures in respect
of a product originating in certain Members and a different system of
import licensing procedures on the same product originating in other
Members.”(5) In doing so, the Appellate Body drew a distinction between
licensing rules per se, on the one hand, and their application
and administration, on the other:
“By its very terms, Article 1.3 of the
Licensing Agreement clearly
applies to the application and administration of import licensing
procedures, and requires that this application and administration be ‘neutral …
fair and equitable’.
Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement does
not require the import licensing rules, as such, to be neutral,
fair and equitable. Furthermore, the context of Article 1.3
—
including the preamble,
Article 1.1 and, in particular, Article 1.2 of the Licensing Agreement
—
supports the conclusion that Article 1.3
does not apply to import licensing rules. Article 1.2
provides,
in relevant part, as follows:
‘Members shall ensure that the administrative procedures used to
implement import licensing régimes are in conformity with the relevant
provisions of GATT 1994 … as interpreted by this Agreement, …’
As a matter of fact, none of the provisions of the Licensing
Agreement concerns import licensing rules, per se. As is made
clear by the title of the Licensing Agreement, it concerns import
licensing procedures. The preamble of the Licensing Agreement
indicates clearly that this agreement relates to import licensing
procedures and their administration, not to import licensing rules. Article 1.1 of the
Licensing Agreement defines its scope as the administrative
procedures used for the operation of import licensing regimes.
We conclude, therefore, that the Panel erred in finding that
Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement
precludes the imposition of different
import licensing systems on like products when imported from different
Members.”(6)
5. In Korea
—
Various Measures on Beef, the Panel
followed the distinction between licensing rules per se and their
administration, set out in the finding of the Appellate Body referenced
in paragraph 4 above. The Panel examined the United States’ claim that
Korea’s regulatory regime was inconsistent with Article 3.2 of the
Licensing Agreement by granting exclusive authority to the LPMO and the
SBS system to import beef, holding:
“[T]he Panel notes that many of the US claims regarding alleged
violations of the Licensing Agreement are concerned with the substantive
provisions of Korea’s import (and distribution) regime (by the LPMO or
SBS super-groups). It has been said repeatedly that such substantive
matters are of no relevance to the Licensing Agreement which is
concerned with the administrative rules of import licensing systems.(7)
For these reasons, the Panel does not reach any general conclusion on
the compatibility of Korea’s import licensing system with the WTO
Agreement.”(8)
6. With respect to the distinction between licensing rules per se
and their administration, see also paragraph 12
below.
2. Article 1.2
(a) Interpretation
7. The Panel in EC
—
Bananas III addressed the issue
of whether Article 1.2 in itself creates obligations additional to those
arising from the GATT 1994. The Panel considered the provisions of the
Agreement, the 1979 Agreement and the GATT 1947, and concluded that “Article 1.2 of the WTO
Licensing Agreement has become largely duplicative of the
obligations already provided for in GATT, except for the reference to
developing country Members. Given the context, Article 1.2 of the WTO
Licensing Agreement has lost most of its legal significance.”(9) Relying
on the principle of effective treaty interpretation,(10) the Panel found:
“[T]o the extent that we find that specific aspects of the EC
licensing procedures are not in conformity with Articles
I, III or X of
GATT, we necessarily also find an inconsistency with the requirements of
Article 1.2 of the WTO
Licensing Agreement.”(11)
8. The Panel in EC
—
Bananas III also addressed the
legal significance of the reference in Article 1.2
to developing country
Members:
“With respect to Article 1.2’s requirement that account should be
taken of ‘economic development purposes and financial and trade needs
of developing country Members’, the Licensing Agreement does not give
guidance as to how that obligation should be applied in specific cases.
We believe that this provision could be interpreted as a recognition of
the difficulties that might arise for developing country Members, in
imposing licensing procedures, to comply fully with the provisions of
GATT and the Licensing Agreement. In the alternative, Article 1.2
could
also be read to authorize, but not to require, developed country Members
to apply preferential licensing procedures to imports from developing
country Members. In any event, even if we accept the latter
interpretation, we have not been presented with evidence suggesting
that, in its licensing procedures, there were factors that the EC should
have but did not take into account under Article 1.2.
Therefore, we do not make a finding on whether the EC failed to take
into account the needs of developing countries in a manner inconsistent
with the requirements of Article 1.2 of the WTO
Licensing Agreement.”(12)
9. In EC
—
Poultry, Brazil argued that the European
Communities had violated the prohibition of trade distortion contained
in Articles 1.2 and 3.2 of the Licensing Agreement. The Panel rejected
Brazil’s claim. On appeal, Brazil argued that the Panel had failed to
address or examine properly certain evidence, including evidence
concerning Brazil’s falling share of the poultry market in the
European Communities, and had not examined whether this falling market
share was caused by the introduction of the European Communities
licensing procedures for the tariff-rate quota for frozen poultry meat.
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel. It noted that the EC Regulation at
issue gave Brazil a 45 per cent share of the total tariff-rate quota
(the same as Brazil’s share of exports of the product to the EC during
the preceding three years); because the licences were fully utilized,
Brazil’s share of the tariff-rate quota remained at 45 per cent and
Brazil’s volume of exports of the product to the EC had risen since
imposition of the tariff-rate quota.(13) The Appellate Body found that
Brazil had failed to establish a causal link between the decline in
market share and other indicators, on the one hand, and the licensing
requirements at issue, on the other:
“Brazil has not, in our view, clearly explained, either before the
Panel or before us, how the licensing procedure caused the
decline in market share. Brazil has not offered any persuasive evidence
that its falling market share could, in this particular case — with a
constant percentage share of the tariff-rate quota, full utilization of
the tariff-rate quota and a growing total volume of exports — be
viewed as constituting trade distortion attributable to the licensing
procedure. In other words, Brazil has not proven a violation of the
prohibition of trade distortion in Articles
1.2 and 3.2 of the Licensing Agreement
by the European Communities.
Brazil argues that the Panel did not consider a number of other
arguments in its examination of the existence of trade distortion: that
licences have been apportioned in non-economic quantities; that there
have been frequent changes to the licensing rules; that licence
entitlement has been based on export performance; and that there has
been speculation in licences. These arguments, however, do not address
the problem of establishing a causal relationship between imposition of
the EC licensing procedure and the claimed trade distortion. Even if
conceded arguendo, these arguments do not provide proof of the
essential element of causation.
For these reasons, we uphold the finding of the Panel that Brazil has
not established that the European Communities has acted inconsistently
with either Article 1.2 or Article 3.2 of the
Licensing Agreement.”(14)
10. Regarding the implications of
Article 1.2 for the scope of the
Licensing Agreement, see also paragraph 3 above.
(b) Relationship with GATT provisions
11. Regarding the relationship between
Article 1.2 and provisions of
the GATT 1994, see paragraph 7
above.
3. Article 1.3
(a) Import licensing on the basis of export performance
12. In EC
—
Poultry, the Panel examined Brazil’s
claim that the EC’s allocation of import licences on the basis of
export performance was inconsistent with Articles 1.3
and 3.5(j) of the
Licensing Agreement. The Panel noted:
“The requirement of export performance for the issuance of import
licences on its face does seem unusual. However, Brazil has not
elaborated on how the export performance requirement was administered
and how it has affected the in-quota exports of poultry products from
Brazil.”
13. Recalling the Appellate Body’s finding in Bananas III
(referred to in paragraph 4 above), that Articles 1.3
applies to the
administration of import licensing procedures, not to import licensing
rules as such, the Panel further found: “In our view, the issue of
licence entitlement based on export performance is clearly that of
rules, not that of application or administration of import licensing
procedures. Thus, Articles 1.3 is not applicable on this specific issue.”(15)
4. Article 1.4(a)
(a) General
14. In EC
—
Poultry, the Panel examined a claim that
the European Communities had failed to notify the Committee on Import
Licensing of the sources where the information on its poultry tariff
quota was published, as required by Article 1.4(a). The European
Communities responded that it had not made such a notification because
prior to the Appellate Body report in the EC — Bananas III
case, it was not clear whether the Licensing Agreement applied to
tariff-rate quotas (“TRQs”). The Panel rejected the EC’s defence:
“While we note the EC’s explanation for non-notification, we find
this omission to be inconsistent with Article 1.4(a)
of the Licensing Agreement. The fact that all the relevant information is published and
that the administration of all agricultural TRQs in the EC has been
notified to the WTO Committee on Agriculture does not in our view excuse
the EC from notifying the sources of publication pursuant to this
subparagraph.”(16)
15. The Panel in EC
—
Poultry also rejected Brazil’s
claim that frequent changes to the licensing rules and procedures
regarding the poultry TRQ had made it difficult for governments and
traders to become familiar with the rules, contrary to the provisions of
Articles 1.4, 3.3, 3.5(b),
3.5(c) and 3.5(d):
“We note that the transparency requirement under the cited
provisions is limited to publication of rules and other relevant
information. While we have sympathy for Brazil regarding the
difficulties caused by frequent changes to the rules, we find that
changes in rules per se do not constitute a violation of Article
1.4, 3.3, 3.5(b),
3.5(c) or 3.5(d).”(17)
(b) Procedures for notification and review
16. At its meeting of 12 October 1995, the Committee on Import
Licensing agreed on procedures for notification and review under the
Licensing Agreement.(18)
III. Article 2
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A. Text of Article 2
Article 2: Automatic Import Licensing(4)
(footnote original)
4 Those import licensing procedures
requiring a security which have no restrictive effects on imports are to
be considered as falling within the scope of paragraphs 1
and 2.
1. Automatic import licensing is defined as import licensing where
approval of the application is granted in all cases, and which is in
accordance with the requirements of paragraph
2(a).
2. The following
provisions(5), in addition to those in paragraphs 1 through 11 of Article 1 and
paragraph 1 of this Article, shall apply to
automatic import licensing procedures:
(footnote original)
5 A developing country Member, other than
a developing country Member which was a Party to the Agreement on Import
Licensing Procedures done on 12 April 1979, which has specific
difficulties with the requirements of subparagraphs (a)(ii)
and (a)(iii)
may, upon notification to the Committee, delay the application of these
subparagraphs by not more than two years from the date of entry into
force of the WTO Agreement for such Member.
(a)
automatic licensing procedures shall not be administered in such
a manner as to have restricting effects on imports subject to automatic
licensing. Automatic licensing procedures shall be deemed to have
trade-restricting effects unless, inter alia:
(i) any person, firm or institution which fulfils the legal
requirements of the importing Member for engaging in import operations
involving products subject to automatic licensing is equally eligible to
apply for and to obtain import licences;
(ii) applications for licences may be submitted on any working day
prior to the customs clearance of the goods;
(iii) applications for licences when submitted in appropriate and
complete form are approved immediately on receipt, to the extent
administratively feasible, but within a maximum of 10 working days;
(b) Members recognize that automatic import licensing may be
necessary whenever other appropriate procedures are not available.
Automatic import licensing may be maintained as long as the
circumstances which gave rise to its introduction prevail and as long as
its underlying administrative purposes cannot be achieved in a more
appropriate way.
B. Interpretation and Application of Article 2
1. General
(a) Application of Article 2.2(a)(ii)
and (iii) to developing country
Members
17. The following developing country Members that were not parties to
the 1979 Agreement invoked the provisions of footnote 5 regarding
delayed application of Article 2.2(a)(ii)
and/or Article 2.2(a)(iii):
Bangladesh (1 January 1995), Bolivia (13 September 1995), Brazil (1
January 1995), Burkina Faso (3 June 1995), Cameroon (13 December 1995),
Colombia (30 April 1995), Costa Rica (1 January 1995), Côte d’Ivoire
(1 January 1995), Dominican Republic (9 March 1995), El Salvador (7 May
1995), Gabon (1 January 1995), Guatemala (21 June 1995), Honduras (1
January 1995), Indonesia (1 January 1995), Kenya (1 January 1995),
Malaysia (1 January 1995), Myanmar (1 January 1995), Sri Lanka (1
January 1995), Thailand (1 January 1995), Tunisia (29 March 1995),
Turkey (26 March 1995), United Arab Emirates (10 April 1996), Uruguay (1
January 1995) and Venezuela (1 January 1995).(19)
18. In its annual report for 1998, with reference to this delay in
application, the Committee on Import Licensing stated the following:
“It was noted that the two-year period of delay allowed under the
Agreement had expired for all these Members, and accordingly the
obligations of Article 2.2(a)(ii) and
(a)(iii) apply to all current WTO
Members. It was recalled that the invocation of the above provisions did
not exempt the Members concerned from the obligation to notify under the
Agreement. The mandatory notifications included publications and
legislation relevant to import licensing, and replies to the
Questionnaire on Import Licensing Procedures by 30 September each year.
Those Members that had not yet made the necessary notifications under
the Agreement were urged to do so at the earliest opportunity.”(20)
IV. Article 3
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A. Text of Article 3
Article 3: Non-Automatic Import Licensing
1. The following provisions, in addition to those in
paragraphs 1 through 11 of Article
1, shall apply to non-automatic import licensing
procedures. Non-automatic import licensing procedures are defined as
import licensing not falling within the definition contained in paragraph 1 of Article
2.
2. Non-automatic licensing shall not have trade-restrictive or -distortive
effects on imports additional to those caused by the imposition of the
restriction. Non-automatic licensing procedures shall correspond in
scope and duration to the measure they are used to implement, and shall
be no more administratively burdensome than absolutely necessary to
administer the measure.
3. In the case of licensing requirements for purposes other than the
implementation of quantitative restrictions, Members shall publish
sufficient information for other Members and traders to know the basis
for granting and/ or allocating licences.
4. Where a Member provides the possibility for persons, firms or
institutions to request exceptions or derogations from a licensing
requirement, it shall include this fact in the information published
under paragraph 4 of Article 1 as well as information on how to make
such a request and, to the extent possible, an indication of the
circumstances under which requests would be considered.
5. (a) Members shall provide, upon the request of any Member having
an interest in the trade in the product concerned, all relevant
information concerning:
(i) the administration of the restrictions;
(ii) the import licences granted over a recent period;
(iii) the distribution of such licences among supplying countries;
(iv) where practicable, import statistics (i.e. value and/or volume)
with respect to the products subject to import licensing. Developing
country Members would not be expected to take additional administrative
or financial burdens on this account;
(b) Members administering quotas by means of licensing shall publish
the overall amount of quotas to be applied by quantity and/or value, the
opening and closing dates of quotas, and any change thereof, within the
time periods specified in paragraph 4 of
Article 1 and in such a manner
as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them;
(c) in the case of quotas allocated among supplying countries, the
Member applying the restrictions shall promptly inform all other Members
having an interest in supplying the product concerned of the shares in
the quota currently allocated, by quantity or value, to the various
supplying countries and shall publish this information within the time
periods specified in paragraph 4 of
Article 1 and in such a manner as
to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them;
(d) where situations arise which make it necessary to provide for an
early opening date of quotas, the information referred to in paragraph 4 of
Article 1 should be published within the time-periods specified in paragraph 4 of
Article 1 and in such a manner as to enable governments
and traders to become acquainted with them;
(e) any person, firm or institution which fulfils the legal and
administrative requirements of the importing Member shall be equally
eligible to apply and to be considered for a licence. If the licence
application is not approved, the applicant shall, on request, be given
the reason there for and shall have a right of appeal or review in
accordance with the domestic legislation or procedures of the importing
Member;
(f) the period for processing applications shall, except when not
possible for reasons outside the control of the Member, not be longer
than 30 days if applications are considered as and when received, i.e.
on a first-come first-served basis, and no longer than 60 days if all
applications are considered simultaneously. In the latter case, the
period for processing applications shall be considered to begin on the
day following the closing date of the announced application period;
(g) the period of licence validity shall be of reasonable duration
and not be so short as to preclude imports. The period of licence
validity shall not preclude imports from distant sources, except in
special cases where imports are necessary to meet unforeseen short-term
requirements;
(h) when administering quotas, Members shall not prevent importation
from being effected in accordance with the issued licences, and shall
not discourage the full utilization of quotas;
(i) when issuing licences, Members shall take into account the
desirability of issuing licences for products in economic quantities;
(j) in allocating licences, the Member should consider the import
performance of the applicant. In this regard, consideration should be
given as to whether licences issued to applicants in the past have been
fully utilized during a recent representative period. In cases where
licences have not been fully utilized, the Member shall examine the
reasons for this and take these reasons into consideration when
allocating new licences. Consideration shall also be given to ensuring a
reasonable distribution of licences to new importers, taking into
account the desirability of issuing licences for products in economic
quantities. In this regard, special consideration should be given to
those importers importing products originating in developing country
Members and, in particular, the least-developed country Members;
(k) in the case of quotas administered through licences which are not
allocated among supplying countries, licence holders(6) shall be free to
choose the sources of imports. In the case of quotas allocated among
supplying countries, the licence shall clearly stipulate the country or
countries;
(footnote original)
6 Sometimes referred to as “quota
holders”.
(l) in applying paragraph 8 of Article
1, compensating adjustments
may be made in future licence allocations where imports exceeded a
previous licence level.
B. Interpretation and Application of Article 3
1. Article 3.1
(a) Scope of Article 3
19. With respect to the scope of
Article 3,
see paragraphs 2, 3 and 5
above.
2. Article 3.2
20. Regarding the application of
Article 3.2,
see paragraph 9 above.
21. With respect to the legal implication of
Article 3.2 for the
scope of the Licensing Agreement, see paragraph 3
above.
3. Article 3.3
22. Concerning the issue of whether frequent changes in licensing
procedures are inconsistent with Article
3.3, see
paragraph 15 above.
4. Article 3.5(a)
23. In EC
—
Poultry, Brazil asserted that traders
could not determine which consignments were being imported within or
outside the TRQ, and argued that this fact meant that the EC was not
administering the licensing system in a transparent manner, thereby
violating Article 3.5(a)(iii) and (iv). The EC responded that it had
provided the relevant information when requested.(21) The Panel rejected
Brazil’s claim because Brazil had not demonstrated that there had been
any case where the EC had failed to provide the required information
despite a request by Brazil, and found:
“Article 3.5(a) addresses specific situations in the operation of
an import licensing scheme, subject to requests from Members. It is
clear that Article 3.5(a) does not obligate Members to provide
voluntarily complete and relevant information on the distribution of
licences among supplying countries and statistics on volumes and values.”(22)
24. In EC
—
Poultry, Brazil argued on appeal that the
Panel had erred in restricting Brazil’s “comprehensive claim in
relation to a violation of the general principle of transparency
underlying the Licensing Agreement” to an analysis of Article 3.5(a) of the Licensing Agreement. Brazil’s
argument was that “the
administration of import licences in such a way that the exporter does
not know what trade rules apply is a breach of the fundamental objective
of the Licensing Agreement.” The Appellate Body, however, upheld the
Panel’s approach and the Panel’s finding that the European
Communities measure was not inconsistent with Article
3.5(a) of the Licensing Agreement:
“Brazil’s notice of appeal contained no reference to a general
issue of transparency in relation to the Licensing Agreement. However,
Brazil argued in its appellant’s submission that the Panel erred in
restricting Brazil’s ‘comprehensive claim in relation to a violation
of the general principle of transparency underlying the Licensing
Agreement’ to an analysis of
Article 3.5(a) of the Licensing Agreement. The contention of Brazil is that ‘the administration of
import licences in such a way that the exporter does not know what trade
rules apply is a breach of the fundamental objective of the Licensing
Agreement’.
Brazil argued before the Panel that ‘underlying the Licensing
Agreement was the principle of transparency.’ Brazil submitted, in
particular, that the European Communities was obliged under either Article 3.5(a)(iii) or (iv) of the Licensing Agreement
to provide
complete and relevant information on the distribution of licences among
supplying countries and statistics on volumes and values. According to
Brazil, the European Communities failed to fulfil this obligation. The
Panel found that Brazil had not demonstrated that the European
Communities had violated either Article 3.5(a)(iii) or
(iv) of
the Licensing Agreement. In the light of the existence of express provisions
in Article 3.5(a) of the Licensing Agreement
relating to transparency on
which the Panel did in fact make findings, we do not believe that the
Panel erred by refraining from examining Brazil’s ‘comprehensive’
claim relating to a general principle of transparency purportedly
underlying the Licensing Agreement.”(23)
5. Article 3.5(b)
25. Regarding the issue of whether frequent changes in licensing
procedures are consistent with Article
3.5(b), see paragraph 15 above.
6. Article 3.5(c) and (d)
26. Regarding the issue of whether frequent changes in licensing
procedures are consistent with Article
3.5(c) or (d), see paragraph 15 above.
7. Article 3.5(h)
27. In EC
—
Poultry, Brazil claimed that speculation
in licences discouraged full utilization of the poultry TRQ in violation
of Articles 3.5(h) and 3.5(j). The European Communities responded that
licences awarded under the regulation at issue were non-transferable, so
as to avoid such speculation. The Panel rejected Brazil’s claim:
“While it may be true that Brazilian exporters have had additional
difficulties in exporting to the EC market due to the speculation in
licences, we note that the licences allocated to imports from Brazil
have been fully utilized. In other words, the speculation in licences
has not discouraged the full utilization of the TRQ. Thus, we do not
find that the EC has acted inconsistently with Articles 3.5(h) and 3.5(j)
of the Licensing Agreement in this regard.”(24)
28. In Turkey
—
Rice, the United States claimed that
Turkey discouraged full utilization of the tariff rate quota on rice by
requiring licence applicants to comply with a domestic purchase
requirement. The Panel declined to rule on the US claim under Article 3.5(h)
as it had ruled that the domestic purchase requirement violated Article III:4 of
GATT 1994.(25)
8. Article 3.5(i)
29. In EC
—
Poultry, Brazil claimed that the
allocation of licences where each applicant received a licence allowing
imports of about 5 tonnes was inconsistent with Article 3.5(i)
regarding
issuance of licences in economic quantities. As a related matter, Brazil
claimed that the absence of a newcomer provision in the regulation
regarding the operation of the poultry TRQ was inconsistent with Article
3.5(j). The European Communities responded that licences for the
quantity of about 5 tonnes were indeed being issued to newcomers and
that the allocation of licences in small quantities was made in response
to an ever increasing number of importers. The Panel rejected Brazil’s
claims under Article 3.5(i)
and (j) and found:
“We note Brazil’s argument that its exporters are facing
difficulties in dealing with licences for small quantities, which is
echoed in Thailand’s third-party submission also. While the decline in
the average quantity per licence may cause problems for traders, we note
at the same time that the total TRQ has been fully utilized. The very
fact that the licences have been fully utilized suggests to us that the
quantities involved are still ‘economic’, particularly in
combination with the significant amount of the over-quota trade.”(26)
9. Article 3.5(j)
30. The Panel in EC
—
Poultry examined Brazil’s
claim that the European Communities allocation of import licences on the
basis of export performance was inconsistent with Articles 1.3 and
3.5(j) of the Licensing Agreement. While the Panel opined that “the
requirement of export performance for the issuance of import licences on
its face does seem unusual”, it nevertheless held that “the
provision of Article 3.5(j) in this regard is hortatory and does not
necessarily prohibit the consideration of other factors than import
performance”.(27)
31. Concerning Brazil’s other claims under
Article 3.5(j) in EC — Poultry, see paragraph 29 above (newcomer provisions)
and 27 above
(speculation in licences).
C. Relationship with other WTO Agreements
1. GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Agriculture
32. In Canada
—
Dairy, the Panel addressed the United
States’ claim that Canada was in violation of Article II of the
GATT 1994 and Article 3 of the Licensing Agreement
because it restricted
access to tariff quotas to certain cross-border imports by Canadians.
Having found that the restriction was inconsistent with Article II:1(b)
of the GATT 1994, the Panel did not find it necessary to examine whether
in so doing, Canada also violated Article 3 of the Licensing
Agreement.(28)
33. Similarly, the Panel in Turkey
—
Rice did not
find it necessary to examine claims under Articles 3.5(a), 5.1,
5.2, 5.3
and 5.4 of the Agreement, as it had found that Turkey’s failure to
grant Certificates of Control to import rice outside of the tariff-rate
quota substantively violated Article 4.2 of the Agreement on
Agriculture.(29) The Panel in Turkey
—
Rice also declined
to rule on a US claim under Articles 3.5(h)
as it had ruled that the
measure at issue violated Article III:4 of GATT 1994.(30)
V. Article 4
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A. Text of Article 4
Article 4: Institutions
There is hereby established a Committee on Import Licensing composed
of representatives from each of the Members. The Committee shall elect
its own Chairman and Vice-Chairman and shall meet as necessary for the
purpose of affording Members the opportunity of consulting on any
matters relating to the operation of this Agreement or the furtherance
of its objectives.
B. Interpretation and Application of Article 4
1. Rules of procedure
34. At its meeting of 1 December 1995, the Council for Trade in Goods
approved the rules of procedure for meetings of the Committee on Import
Licensing, where the Committee follows, mutatis mutandis, the
rules of procedure for meetings of the General Council with certain
exceptions.(31)
35. The Committee on Import Licensing has held 16 meetings from 1
January 1995 to 31 December 2002.(32) The Committee has reported to the
Council for Trade in Goods on an annual basis.(33)
2. Procedures for the review of notifications
36. At its meeting on 23 October 1996, the Committee on Import
Licensing adopted the following understanding on procedures for the
review of notifications submitted under the Agreement:
“On the basis of Article 4 of the Agreement, it was recognized that
Members could express views on notifications of import licensing
procedures as required under various Articles of the Agreement, and
request clarifications, as may be necessary, from other Members on
matters related to the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. It was,
however, agreed that such views, and requests for clarification, should
be communicated, in writing, to the delegations concerned with copies
for information to the Secretariat preferably 21 days, but at least ten
working days, in advance of the meeting at which they would be raised.
Replies to the questions should also be forwarded to the delegations
having raised the questions, in writing, with copies for information to
the Secretariat. The questions and replies thus received would be
circulated by the Secretariat.”(34)
3. Overlapping or duplication of notifications
37. On the question of possible duplication or overlapping of
notifications, i.e. whether import licensing aspects associated with the
administration of tariff quotas resulting from tariffication in
agriculture should be notified to the Committee on Import Licensing or
to the Committee on Agriculture, at its meeting of 12 October 1995 the
Committee on Import Licensing agreed that “all import licensing
procedures, including those dealing with the administration of tariff
quotas in agriculture, should be notified to the Committee on Import
Licensing. Any problem that might arise relating to duplication or
overlapping of notifications, as well as related questions of
simplification, could be taken up as necessary, at the appropriate body,
i.e. the Working Group on Notification Obligations and Procedures.”(35)
In its report to the Council for Trade in Goods, dated 21 August 1996,
the Working Group on Notification Obligations and Procedures concluded
that efforts to remove this possible duplication were not warranted.(36)
VI. Article 5
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A. Text of Article 5
Article 5: Notification
1. Members which institute licensing procedures or changes in these
procedures shall notify the Committee of such within 60 days of
publication.
2. Notifications of the institution of import licensing procedures
shall include the following information:
(a) list of products subject to licensing procedures;
(b) contact point for information on eligibility;
(c) administrative body(ies) for submission of applications;
(d) date and name of publication where licensing procedures are
published;
(e) indication of whether the licensing procedure is automatic or
non-automatic according to definitions contained in Articles 2 and 3;
(f) in the case of automatic import licensing procedures, their
administrative purpose;
(g) in the case of non-automatic import licensing procedures,
indication of the measure being implemented through the licensing
procedure; and
(h) expected duration of the licensing procedure if this can be
estimated with some probability, and if not, reason why this information
cannot be provided.
3. Notifications of changes in import licensing procedures shall
indicate the elements mentioned above, if changes in such occur.
4. Members shall notify the Committee of the publication(s) in which
the information required in paragraph 4 of
Article 1 will be published.
5. Any interested Member which considers that another Member has not
notified the institution of a licensing procedure or changes therein in
accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1
through 3 may bring the
matter to the attention of such other Member. If notification is not
made promptly thereafter, such Member may itself notify the licensing
procedure or changes therein, including all relevant and available
information.
B. Interpretation and Application of Article 5
1. General
38. As of 30 September 2011, 34 Members had submitted notifications
relating to the institution of new import licensing procedures or
changes in these procedures under Articles 5.1–5.4.(37)
2. Reverse notifications
39. The 2010 Report of the Committee to the Council for Trade in
Goods notes that as of December 2010, no reverse notification under Article 5.5 had been received since entry into force of the Agreement.
Members have on occasion raised issues during meetings of the
Committee.(38)
VII. Article 6
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A. Text of Article 6
Article 6: Consultation and Dispute Settlement
Consultations and the settlement of disputes with respect to any
matter affecting the operation of this Agreement shall be subject to the
provisions of Articles XXII and
XXIII of GATT 1994, as elaborated and
applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
B. Interpretation and Application of Article 6
1. Articles of the Licensing Agreement invoked in panel and Appellate
Body proceedings
40. For a table of disputes under the Licensing Agreement, see the
table of “Articles of the Covered Agreements Invoked in Panel and
Appellate Body Proceedings” in the Chapter on the DSU.
VIII. Article 7
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A. Text of Article 7
Article 7: Review
1. The Committee shall review as necessary, but at least once every
two years, the implementation and operation of this Agreement, taking
into account the objectives thereof, and the rights and obligations
contained therein.
2. As a basis for the Committee review, the Secretariat shall prepare
a factual report based on information provided under Article 5,
responses to the annual questionnaire on import licensing procedures(7)
and other relevant reliable information which is available to it. This
report shall provide a synopsis of the aforementioned information, in
particular indicating any changes or developments during the period
under review, and including any other information as agreed by the
Committee.
(footnote original)
7 Originally circulated as GATT 1947
document L/3515 of 23 March 1971.
3. Members undertake to complete the annual questionnaire on import
licensing procedures promptly and in full.
4. The Committee shall inform the Council for Trade in Goods of
developments during the period covered by such reviews.
B. Interpretation and Application of Article 7
1. Articles 7.1–7.2: Biennial reviews
41. At its meeting on 12 October 1995, the Committee on Import
Licensing agreed on procedures for reviews under Article 7.1 of the
Licensing Agreement.(39) The Committee has conducted eight biennial
reviews under Article 7.1(40), based on factual reports prepared by the
Secretariat under Article 7.2.
2. Article 7.3: Responses to Annual Questionnaire
42. At its meeting on 12 October 1995, the Committee on Import
Licensing agreed on procedures for notification under Article 7.3 of the
Licensing Agreement, which require all Members to provide replies to the
Questionnaire on Import Licensing Procedures attached to those
procedures by 30 September each year.(41)
43. The annual questionnaire on import licensing provided for in
Article 7.3 was first circulated in 1971 and later in document
L/5670.(42)
The annual notification obligation was first agreed in 1972, when the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to the GATT 1947 adopted a report of the Committee
on Trade in Industrial Products calling on all GATT contracting parties
to notify changes in their import licensing systems on 30 September of
each year.(43) The Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation,
Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, adopted on 28 November 1979 as part
of the Tokyo Round results, reaffirmed the commitment of the GATT 1947
contracting parties to existing obligations under the GATT 1947
regarding publication and notification.(44) As all parties to the 1979
Agreement were contracting parties to the GATT 1947, the 1979 Agreement
did not include any provisions in respect of the annual questionnaire.
44. The Report of the Working Group on Notification Obligations and
Procedures of 10 July 1996 suggested that the notification obligations
in the 1972 Decision were clearly superseded by the procedures adopted
after entry into force of the WTO Agreement, and recommended that the
Council for Trade in Goods propose their deletion.(45) Accordingly, on 19
February 1998, the General Council adopted the following decision:
“The notification obligations resulting from the Decision of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to the GATT 1947 taken at their twenty-eighth
Session in November 1972 (SR.28/6, item 3) to adopt the report of the
Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, including the Committee’s
proposal regarding notification obligations on licensing systems
(L/3756, paragraph 76), are hereby eliminated.”(46)
45. As of 29 October 2010, 98 Members had submitted notifications
under Article 7.3 since 1 January 1995.(47) Eleven Members submitted
replies to the Questionnaire in 1995, 22 Members in 1996, 25 Members in
1997, 26 Members in 1998, 20 Members in 1999, 32 Members in 2000, 23
Members in 2001, 41 Members in 2002, 25 Members in 2003, 16 Members in
2004, 19 Members in 2005, 36 Members in 2006, 46 Members in 2006, 37
Members in 2007, 31 Members in 2008, 42 Members in 2009 and 38 Members
in 2010.(48)
46. Regarding review of notifications, see paragraph 36 above.
3. Article 7.4: Reports to the Council for Trade in Goods
47. The Committee has submitted annual reports to the Council for
Trade in Goods since 1995.(49) The Committee on Import Licensing for the
Agreement (1979) on Import Licensing Procedures submitted annual reports
to the GATT 1947 Council.(50)
IX. Article 8
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A. Text of Article 8
Article 8: Final Provisions
Reservations
1. Reservations may not be entered in respect of any of the
provisions of this Agreement without the consent of the other Members.
Domestic Legislation
2. (a) Each Member shall ensure, not later than the date of entry
into force of the WTO Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of this
Agreement.
(b) Each Member shall inform the Committee of any changes in its laws
and regulations relevant to this Agreement and in the administration of
such laws and regulations.
B. Interpretation and Application of Article 8
1. Coexistence of the Agreement and the 1979 Agreement
48. On 2 May 1995, the Committee on Import Licensing for the 1979
Agreement adopted a Decision on Avoidance of Procedural and
Institutional Duplication proposed by the Preparatory Committee for the
WTO and adopted also by the General Council and the CONTRACTING PARTIES
to the GATT 1947. The decision provided for notification and
coordination procedures for the Tokyo Round and WTO Committees in order
to avoid procedural and institutional duplication during the period of
transition. These procedures covered notification of measures subject to
notification obligations both under the WTO Agreement and under the GATT
1947 or a Tokyo Round Agreement; circulation of such notification;
coordination of activities between the Tokyo Round Committees and WTO
Committees; and joint and/or consecutive meetings, as appropriate,
between such committees.(51)
2. Termination of the 1979 Agreement
49. On 12 October 1995, the parties to the 1979 Agreement on Import
Licensing Procedures adopted a Decision to terminate the 1979 Agreement
as of 1 January 1996, “on a date agreed in advance so as to provide
predictability for policy makers and facilitate an orderly termination
of the institutional framework of the [1979] Agreement”.(52)
3. Reservations
50. Article XVI:5 of the WTO Agreement provides in relevant part that
“[r]eservations in respect of any of the provisions of the
Multilateral Trade Agreements may only be made to the extent provided
for in those Agreements.”
51. At the time of accepting the WTO Agreement or a protocol of
accession to the WTO Agreement, a number of developing countries made
notifications regarding delayed application of Article 2.2(a)(ii) and/or
(iii): see paragraph 17 above.
4. Procedures for notification and review
52. At its meeting on 12 October 1995, the Committee on Import
Licensing agreed on procedures for notification under Article 8.2(b) of
the Licensing Agreement.(53) Regarding review of notifications, see
paragraph 36 above.
Footnotes:
1. Appellate Body Report, EC
— Poultry, para.
121. back to text
2. Appellate Body Report,
EC — Bananas
III, paras.
193–195. back to text
3. Panel Report,
EC — Poultry, para. 249. back to text
4. Appellate Body Report,
EC — Poultry, paras.
121–122. back to text
5. Panel Report, EC — Bananas III,
para. 7.261. back to text
6. Appellate Body Report,
EC — Bananas
III,
paras.
197–198. back to text
7. (footnote original) Appellate Body
Report on EC — Bananas III, para. 197. back to text
8. Panel Report,
Korea — Various
Measures on Beef,
paras. 784–785. back to text
9. Panel Report, EC — Bananas III,
paras. 7.268–7.269. back to text
10. (footnote original) Appellate
Body Report on US — Gasoline, p. 23. back to text
11. Panel Report, EC — Bananas III,
paras. 7.270–7.271. back to text
12. Panel Report, EC — Bananas III,
paras. 7.272–7.273. back to text
13. Appellate Body Report,
EC —
Poultry, para.
125. back to text
14. Appellate Body Report,
EC —
Poultry, paras.
126–128. back to text
15. Panel Report,
EC — Poultry,
para. 254. back to text
16. Panel Report,
EC — Poultry,
para. 244. back to text
17. Panel Report,
EC — Poultry,
para. 246. back to text
18. G/LIC/M/2, paras. 8–9 and 21–23. The text of the agreed
procedures for notification and review can be found in G/LIC/3, para.
(1). Notifications under Article 1.4(a) and Article 8.2(b) are numbered
G/LIC/N/1/-. back to text
19. G/LIC/1
and Addenda 1–3. The date in brackets indicates the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for the Member concerned.
In each case, the invocation was made as part of the Member’s
acceptance of the WTO Agreement. Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement
provides: “A Member which accepts this Agreement after its entry into
force shall implement those concessions and obligations in the
Multilateral Trade Agreements that are to be implemented over a period
of time starting with the entry into force of this Agreement as if it
had accepted this Agreement on the date of its entry into force.” back to text
20. G/L/264, para. 8. back to text
21. Panel Report,
EC — Poultry,
para. 264. back to text
22. Panel Report,
EC — Poultry,
para. 265. back to text
23. Appellate Body Report,
EC —
Poultry, paras.
129–130. back to text
24. Panel Report,
EC — Poultry,
para. 259. back to text
25. Panel Report, Turkey — Rice,
para. 7.301. back to text
26. Panel Report,
EC — Poultry,
para. 262. back to text
27. Panel Report,
EC — Poultry,
para. 255. back to text
28. Panel Report,
Canada — Dairy,
para. 7.157. back to text
29. Panel Report, Turkey — Rice,
para. 7.292. back to text
30. Panel Report, Turkey — Rice,
para. 7.301; see
para. 28 above. back to text
31. G/C/M/7, para. 2.2. The text of the adopted rules of
procedure can be found in G/L/147. back to text
32. Minutes: G/LIC/M/1–33. back to text
33. Reports to the Council for Trade in Goods:
G/L/29, 127, 203, 264, 336, 403, 493,
573
and Add.1,
652,
715,
753,
800,
836,
868,
903,
941 and
Corr.1. back to text
34. G/LIC/M/4, para. 5. The text of the adopted Understanding can
be found in G/LIC/4. Questions and replies circulated under these
procedures are numbered G/LIC/Q/-. back to text
35. G/LIC/M/2, paras. 21–23. back to text
36. G/NOP/W/16/Rev.1, paras. 25–28. back to text
37. G/L/941 and updates. Notifications: see document series G/LIC/N/2. back to text
38. G/L/941, para. 6. back to text
39. G/LIC/M/2, para. 34;
G/LIC/3, para. 2. back to text
40. (First biennial review — 1996) G/LIC/M/4, paras. 46–49,
G/LIC/5; (Second — 1998)
G/LIC/M/8, para. 4,
G/LIC/6; (Third — 2000)
G/LIC/M/12,
para. 5, G/LIC/7; (Fourth — 2002)
G/LIC/M/12, para. 5,
G/LIC/9
and Rev.1; (Fifth — 2004)
G/LIC/M/20, para. 5,
G/LIC/12; (Sixth —
2006) G/LIC/M/24, para. 5,
G/LIC/W/27; (Seventh — 2008)
G/LIC/M/28,
para. 4, G/LIC/18; (Eighth — 2010)
G/LIC/M/32, para. 3,
G/LIC/21 and
Corr.1. back to text
41. G/LIC/3
(decision and attached questionnaire); G/LIC/2
(questionnaire); G/LIC/M/2, paras. 18–19. back to text
42. Document L/5670, dated 6 April 1984, reproduced the
questionnaire (originally circulated in L/3515) and listed notifications
on import licensing made in accordance with these procedures. Later
notifications on import licensing under the GATT 1947 were issued as
addenda to L/5670. back to text
43. L/3756, “Committee on Trade in Industrial Products: Report
to the Council”, 24 October 1972, para. 76; SR.28/6, item 3. back to text
44. BISD 26S/210, para. 2. back to text
45. G/L/112, paras. 64–65; Council for Trade in Goods proposal
at G/L/134, section II. back to text
46. WT/L/261;
WT/GC/M/26, item 8. back to text
47. G/L/941; the European Union and its member States are counted
as one Member. back to text
48. For these notifications, see document series G/LIC/N/3/-. back to text
49. G/L/29,
127,
203,
264,
336,
403,
493,
573 and
Add.1,
652,
715,
753,
800,
836,
868,
903,
941 and
Corr.1. back to text
50. BISD 27S/40, 28S/36, 29S/57, 30S/62, 31S/279. 32S/178,
33S/220, 34S/212, 35S/376, 36S/450, 37S/311, 38S/93, 39S/398, 40S/347,
41S/457, 42S/195. back to text
51. LIC/M/36, paras. 7–8;
PC/11,
L/7582. back to text
52. LIC/25; BISD 42S/198. back to text
53. G/LIC/M/2, paras. 6–16. The agreed rules are set out in
G/LIC/3,
para. 4. Notifications filed under Article 8.2(b)
(and Article 1.4(a))
are numbered G/LIC/N/1/-. back to text
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